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Management accounting change has been shown not to be an easy and straightforward undertaking and
attempts to change management accounting systems often give rise to various types of resistance. This
thesis explores management accounting change (MAC) as a process and focuses on resistance and barriers
to MAC.
  The empirical research has been conducted as a qualitative single case study exploring management
accounting change taking place between 2016 and 2019 in a mid-size Finland based publicly traded
company. In the timeframe of the study, the target company has gone through comprehensive structural
and accounting changes that resulted in comprehensive changes to lines of accountability, the management
accounting system and performance measures.
  The thesis has adopted Kasurinen (2002) change model as its primary theoretical framework as the model
provides a holistic and comprehensive way to analyze MAC. In addition, the thesis is drawing from wide
range of qualitative MAC literature revealing prior findings on the phenomenon as well as resistance and
barriers to MAC.
  The research findings support the prior literature findings of MAC as a process which has been variously
affected and frustrated by internal dynamics of the organization. Moreover, the study contributes to the
MAC literature and to the Kasurinen (2002) model by connecting sources of resistance highlighted by the
literature to the barriers in the model.
  Finally, the main contribution of the thesis to MAC literature is the suggested inclusion of leaders and
momentum for stability into the Kasurinen (2002) model as this better represents the countering forces of
change and stability in MAC.
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1 Introduction
In 1983, Hopwood highlighted the need for more case studies in management accounting
(Cobb et al., 1995). Since then, management accounting change has been extensively studied
using qualitative methods. These studies have a revealed a fascinating world of management
accounting change efforts are initiated by external pressures such as increased competition
(Innes and Mitchell, 1990; Cobb et al., 1995; Burns, 2000; Munir et al., 2013), regulatory
changes (Munir et al., 2013; Liguori and Steccolini, 2011) or even gain legitimacy (Siti-
Nabiha and Scapens 2005; Dillard et al., 2004) and maintain appearance of rationality (Burns
and Scapens, 2000). Furthermore, these studies have shown management accounting change
to often - ; Vaivio 1999) where complex
internal dynamics of the organization interlink with external pressures leading to emergence
of new accounting practices, abandonment of change efforts and outcomes other than
originally intended (Vaivio, 1999; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; Liguori and Steccolini,
2011; Valuckas 2018).
Management accounting change has been shown not to be an easy and straightforward
undertaking and attempts to change management accounting systems give rise to various
types of resistance. However, it has been argued that resistance to MAC and stability of
 phenomenon and only limited amount of
studies have analyzed this further (Granlund, 2001), and only few attempts have been made
to explain the dynamics that promote inertia in management accounting change (van der
Steen, 2009). Therefore, intensive research should be conducted towards why management
 of accounting
change (Burns and Vaivio, 2001).
Nevertheless, there has been a number of studies conducted in the field of management
accounting change that have revealed multiple sources of resistance and contributed to
understanding stability of management accounting systems. Many of these studies view
management accounting as a routine organizational practice and have concluded that
accounting change is resisted as people feel comfortable with routines and they provide
ontological security (Burns, 2000; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Valuckas, 2018; Van der Steen,
2009). In similar fashion, organizational as well as national culture has been shown to
frustrate management accounting change efforts where the goal has been to increase
financial accountability (Kasurinen, 2002; Busco and Scapens, 2011; Van der Steen, 2009;
Wahiyudi, 2009; Valuckas, 2018). Meanwhile, it has also been argued that sometimes
resistance is stemming from the employees not seeing the need for change as the state of the
company and its systems are perceived satisfactory even if contradictory evidence is
presented (Liguori and Steccolini, 2011; Lukka, 2007, Kasurinen, 2002; Van der Steen,
2009). Whether the resistance is stemming from adherence to routines, culture or believe
that there is no need for change, taken for
granted assumptions of the state of the company and how things should be done.
As management accounting systems are used to collect and manipulate information used in
decision making, changes in them have impact on career progression and resource allocation
and as such, change efforts are inherently linked to power distribution within the
organization (Kasurinen, 2002). Management accounting change efforts have been revealed
to lead to power struggles between finance and other functions (Nor-Aziah and Scapens.
2007), between parent company driving the change and units on the receiving end (Scapens
and Roberts, 1993) as well as within the accountants themselves (Granlund, 2001).
Management accounting change is often related to increased visibility and when this
visibility is coupled with increased financial accountability, it can be viewed as a threat to
autonomy of operations or subunits and their operative performance (Scapens and Roberts,
1993; Nor-Aziah and Scapens. 2007). Meanwhile, issues of trust are argued to be essential
in management accounting change efforts. Studies have shown that lack of trust in the system
being implemented, the actual goals of the change or in the individuals implementing the
change, can give rise to resentment and resistance to change (Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007;
Busco et al., 2006; Johansson and Baldvindottir, 2003).
In the end, management accounting change is viewed differently by different employee
groups. For top management, change is often an opportunity whereas for employees and
middle management change is not desirable nor welcome (Kasurinen, 2002). Therefore,
resistance to management accounting change is inevitable. In addition, there are often real
underlying concerns and therefore, resistance to management accounting change should not
be branded irrational (Granlund, 2001; Scapens and Roberts, 1993). Finally, the resistance
and barriers have been shown to , lead to abandonment of
change effort, affect the structure of MAS being implemented or even lead to only symbolic
implementation of the management accounting system resulting in little or no managerial
and operative implications see for example: Lukka 2007; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005;
Burns, 2000).
The objective of this thesis is to add to the management accounting change literature by
revealing how management accounting change has taken place in the target company. The
specific focus is to answer the calls for more in depth studies for exploring resistance to
management accounting change and stability of management accounting systems. For this
purpose, the study has applied Kasurinen (2002) change model that takes into consideration
the advancing and hindering forces of change and is argued by multiple researchers
(Valuckas, 2018; Munir et al., 2013; Kasurinen, 2002) to provide a more comprehensive and
holistic understanding of processes of change. However, the model directs to view
management accounting change as a top-down effort and incorporates resistance to change
and stability of management accounting systems through the barriers to change. Therefore,
additional objective of this thesis is to explore how stability and resistance could be
incorporated into the model more comprehensively. As such, the research question that the
thesis strives to address is:
How has MAC unfolded in the target company as process, what resistance and
barriers MAC has it encountered and how these have contributed to stability of the
MAS?
1.1 Research method and material
Single case studies in management accounting have potential to produce rich accounts which
can be especially useful for analyzing conflicts that arise in organizational setting as well as
their underlying tensions (Ahrens and Dent, 1998). As such, they can provide a deeper
understanding into the studied phenomenon than large sample field research (Vaivio, 2008;
Ahrens and Dent, 1998). More specifically, management accounting change needs to be
examined in its specific organizational settings as microlevel analysis is needed to reveal the
dynamic processes of change (Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007).
Therefore, the field research is conducted as a qualitative single case study exploring how
management accounting change (MAC) has unfolded in a mid-size publicly traded Finnish
multinational company. In the timeframe of the study, the target company has gone through
comprehensive structural change from functional organization to a matrix organization and
eventually a business unit organization. As a result, the areas of responsibility and lines of
accountability have been redrawn extensively. As such, management accounting has
undergone major changes to facilitate the new organizational structure of the company.
Furthermore, the management accounting reporting has gradually developed to include cash
flow and balance sheet metrics in addition to cost center and other PL measures extending
the financial the financial accountability of the managers. Therefore, the company is a good
target to study MAC as a process.
The six semi-structured interviews are the primary data of the study and have been conducted
in English and Finnish either face-to-face or by Teams. The interviews were limited to top
management, business line managers and head of operations as they are the primary users of
the reports produced by the system and the ones being held accountable for the results. In
addition to interviews, the researcher has used multiple sources of data such as reports
produced by the MAS, annual reports, press releases, board materials and other internal
documents.
While the management accounting change is accompanied by organizational change and
cannot be fully separated from it, the scope of this study is to focus on the management
accounting change, stability of management accounting system and resistance to
management accounting change. Therefore, the literature is limited to management
accounting change literature and organizational change literature is out of scope.
1.2 Structure of the study
The thesis consists of six chapters of which the first chapter is the introduction. The
following chapter will present the literature in management accounting change, stability and
resistance as well as introduce the theoretical framework of the study. The focus of the
chapter is to explore findings of resistance to management accounting change in prior
research, present the Kasurinen (2002) change model and how it has been used by other
researchers. The literature review is followed by methodology chapter where the chosen
empirical method is more thoroughly examined and its benefits and pitfalls are discussed.
The fourth chapter will present the case company and empirical findings of the study. In the
fifth chapter, these findings will be analyzed using the theoretical framework and discussed
in relation to prior literature. Finally, the sixth and final chapter will present the final
conclusions of the study, limitations, avenues for future research and managerial
recommendations
2 Literature review
Management accounting systems (MAS) provide information to the management for
analysis and control purposes. A MAS can be single accounting tool, technique or a practice
such as budgeting (Liguori and Steccolini; 2011), ABC (Granlund, 2001; Malmi, 1997), total
quality management (Busco et al. 2006) or beyond budgeting (Valuckas, 2018). In addition
to single techniques, a MAS can be viewed more widely as the performance measurement
system as whole (Munir et al.2013) consisting of financial -
measures (Vaivio, 1999). However, ultimately a MAS can be viewed consisting of the
finance department, its personnel, technology, procedures and reports produced by the
system (Cobb et al. 1995).
This study adopts a similar view to Cobb et al. (1995) as the MAS in the study consists of
the reporting in the company and all the systems and inputs required to produce the reporting
as well as the performance measures produced by the system used in holding managers
accountable for their performance. Management accounting change (MAC) is the change in
the management accounting system.
Burns and Vaivio (2001) argue that change is an exciting but problematic concept. What
appears to be change on the surface, might be reduced to non-phenomenon with closer
examination (Burns and Vaivio, 2001). The changed practice or system might be only
symbolically implemented on paper but have little or no managerial and operative
implications and as such, is decoupled from daily activities (see for example: Lukka, 2007;
Burns, 1999; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007). As such,
normative claims of change must be distinguished from empirical evidence (Burns and
Vaivo, 2001). Furthermore, management accounting change can be viewed as centrally
driven where management identifies the need for change, plans and executes it in a linear
systematic fashion (Burns and Vaivio, 2001). However, the change process is often non-
linear in nature as organizations can return to past experiments, reinterpret them and give
them new meaning (Vaivio, 1999). Finally, is management accounting change a distinct
observable episode or should it be approached as continuous organizational process that has
no observable beginning nor end (Burns and Vaivio, 2001). These are factors that need to be
considered when conducting research on management accounting change.
Contemporary survey research shows that change does take place in MA practices but fails
to explain how these changes have taken place in their organizational settings (Innes and
Mitchell, 1990). They suggest that contingency theory perspective can provide explanation
ic
circumstances that include a set of contingent variables such as environment, technology and
organizational structure. However, there are limitations to the use of contingency theory in
MAC research. Innes and Mitchell (1990) argue that contingency theory provides only a
static comparative explanation of why MAS exists in a certain form in the specific context
at any given time. As such, it fails to reveal the dynamics how the changes have led to a
certain state and how it will move from that state. Therefore, contingency theory is mainly
valuable in revealing some of the factors that may drive MAC but not the change process
itself. (Innes and Mitchell, 1990).
According to Burns and Scapens (2000), conventional wisdom sees management accounting
as providing information for planning and control. This view is grounded in neo-classical
economic theory and is based on rationality and equilibrium. Therefore, it has difficulty
analyzing the processes of change. Such research in MAC has been focusing on studying
MAC as an outcome by using static research methods and less focus has been given to
understanding MAC as a process, what it becomes and how. (Burns and Scapens 2000). As
such, management accounting change needs to be examined in its specific organizational
settings as microlevel analysis is needed to reveal the dynamic processes of change (Nor-
Aziah and Scapens, 2007).
Burns and Scapens (2000) have identified three dichotomies that can be useful in analyzing
MAC as a process. However, for the purposes of this thesis the first two of them are the most
relevant. These are formal versus informal change and revolutionary versus evolutionary
change. Firstly, change is revolutionary when it requires a fundamental disruption to existing
routines and ways of thinking whereas evolutionary change is incremental and allows
routines and ways of thinking remain largely unchallenged. However, they further argue that
even revolutionary changes will likely be influenced by pre-existing accounting ways of
working and thinking and therefore, the change process will include evolutionary elements.
(Burns and Scapens, 2000).
Secondly, formal MAC happens through introduction of new MAS by a powerful individual
or group while informal change occurs on the tacit level through for example adaptation to
new operating conditions. In order to be successful, formal change may require change in
ways of thinking and therefore, often needs to be followed by informal change. However, if
informal change lacks behind, the implementation of MAC might fail. Burns and Scapens
(2000). Furthermore, Burns and Vaivio (2001) suggest that organizations drift more than
they would like to admit and management accounting practices are no different. Change is
not always rationally planned and executed and therefore, contains at least some informal
elements in addition to the formal (Burns and Vaivio, 2001).
Finally, it needs to be considered whether the change can be seen as successful or
unsuccessful. In quantitative studies, accounting change success has often been measured by
stage of adoption and by managers perceptions. However, this is problematic as shown by
Malmi (1997) where the same accounting change was perceived successful by top managers
whereas it was deemed unsuccessful by operating unit. On the other hand, Siti-Nabiha and
Scapens (2005) found that the intended formal MAC was only implemented ceremonially
whereas the unintended informal MAC initiated by the former change effort was
implemented informally. As a result, the intended increase in financial accountability did
not take place but operational accountability was increased. As such, the change can be
interpreted as successful and unsuccessful simultaneously. (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005).
During the past two decades, institutional theory, especially old institutional economics
(OIE) and new institutional sociology (NIS) informed frameworks and concepts have
become dominant in qualitative microlevel studies analyzing and understanding
management accounting change as a process (Dillard et al., 2004; Parker, 2012; Alsharari et
al., 2015). Old institutional economics (OIE) focuses on understanding the evolutionary
process of change as well as organizational routines and their institutionalization (Burns and
Scapens, 2000). On the other hand, new institutional sociology (NIS) sees accounting change
as a result of external social and technical influences and as such, focuses on how cultural,
environmental and technical aspects affect management accounting system choice (Liguori
and Stecciolini 2011; Dillard et al., 2004). Therefore, OIE concentrates on accounting
change within an individual organization while (NIS) focuses on effects of external
institutions (Burns and Scapens, 2000).
Liguori and Steccolini (2011) continue that NIS based MAC literature fails to explain why
same practices under same external pressures take different forms in different companies.
Furthermore, NIS based literature see new practices as an outcome of external pressures at
certain time and does not consider the internal dynamics of organization in the process of
MAC (see also Valuckas, 2018). The OIE based literature on the other hand accounts for the
internal dynamics but only through institutionalization of rules and routines. Therefore, it
assumes that the only differentiating factor between organizations MAC adoption is the pre-
existing rules and routines and as such, it does not consider organizational dynamics in other
respects filtering the change (Liguori and Steccolini, 2011; Dillard et al. 2004)
Dillard et al. (2004) add that much of the institutional research has been focused on studying
accounting practices as outcomes at any given point in time and little attention has been
given to the dynamics of change or the role of human agency. As such, research generally
focuses on the stability of MAS as well as its ability to manage incremental, evolutionary
change. Another limitation is that the role of power, special interests and politics have not
been given attention by this research. Also, the decoupling of internal and external operations
directs focus on organizational field level and is not applicable in MAS context at
organization level. (Dillard et al. 2004)
While some researchers have proposed using for example archetype theory (Liguori and
Steccolini, 2011) or bringing in concept of situated rationality (ter Bogt and Scapens, 2019)
to overcome the limitations of NIS and OIE based frameworks, others have proposed to use
complex combinations of NIS and OIE inspired frameworks as well as
mobilization framework or concepts of power, interests and agency (Nor-Aziah and Scapens
2005; Yazdifar et al., 2008; Dillard et al., 2004; Alsharari, 2015). For example, Dillard et al.
(2004) has compiled a framework using NIS theory to account for external pressures and
OIE theory for internal processes while using dynamics of structuration theory. Alsharari et
al. (2015) continued by modifying Dillard et al., (2004) model through replacing
organizational level with OIE based Burns and Scapens (2000) framework and merging with
Hardy (1996) power mobilization framework.
However, some have altogether questioned the use of institutional theories in analyzing
accounting change. For example, Quattrone and Hopper (2001):
Who can judge when processes making an institution a taken for granted and
socially constructed reality are complete? If they are not, then what is an
 constructed and
taken for granted entities and then argue that change is an ongoing process
with no outcomes? Is the concept of institution a useful heuristic for explaining
valid if change is not a passage from a given entity to another but is a process?
Lastly, and above all, what of the concept of change in itself? Who can state,
be they an academic or a manager, whether an institution has changed? How
can an institution become something different (something new) from what it
was before without being charged with reifying the concept of an institution as
a thing?
In addition to institutional research on management accounting change, qualitative studies
have produced a range of unique understandings and contributions of management
accounting change as a process (Parker, 2012). One such tradition has started with Innes and
Mitchell (1990) defining the factors driving MAC as motivators, catalysts and facilitators,
continued by Cobb et al. (1995) who added leaders, momentum for change and barriers, and
finalized by Kasurinen (2002) through expanding barriers to frustrators, confusers and
delayers. Studies using the model have argued it to take agency into account, to provide a
more comprehensive and holistic understanding of processes of change (Valuckas,' 2018;
Kasurinen ,2002; Munir et al. 2013) while providing deeper insight into employees reaction
to change (Munir et al. 2013).
Despite institutional theory having become the dominant perspective to analyzing
management accounting change, taking into consideration the limitations, complexity of
multi-institutional models and criticism that institutional theories have received, this study
will adopt the Innes to Mitchell (1990) to Kasurinen (2002) model as its primary theoretical
framework. However, studies using the model have additionally either used institutional
frameworks as additional theoretical lens or drawn from the concepts and findings of
institutional MAC research to gain further insight into management accounting change
process (Vaivio 1999; Munir et al. 2013; Valuckas 2018). This study applies a similar
approach of drawing from concepts and findings of institutional research for additional
insights especially in relation to nature of change as well as stability of MAS and resistance
to MAC.
Multiple studies have shown that external market pressures such as increased competition
are an important factor in initiating accounting change (Innes and Mitchell, 1990; Cobb et
al., 1995; Burns, 2000; Munir et al., 2013) while others emphasize the role of regulatory
requirements (Munir et al., 2013; Liguori and Steccolini, 2011). In general, external
pressures are important in creating need for accounting change that might not have happened
without an external shock (Burns, 2000). Without external changes such as take-over or
advances in technology, the existing accounting routines and set ways are unlikely to be
reopened and questioned and as such, are resistant to change (Burns and Scapens, 2000).
However, some researchers have emphasized that accounting change is not only the result
of external pressures or regulatory changes. For example, van der Steen (2009) argued that
it was the lack of external pressures due to not having shareholders that motivated the bank
to change its MAS. While Valuckas (2018) notes that previous successful implementation
of the accounting practice in another company can motivate the adoption of new
management accounting practice and as such, the companies can be seen mimicking
successful practices. On the other hand, in line with NIS theorists, Siti-Nabiha and Scapens
(2005) argue that organizations can adopt management accounting systems in order to
appear rational to the internal and external environment. Therefore, MAC can be interpreted
 (Siti-Nabiha and
Scapens 2005; Dillard et al., 2004). This is especially important for government owned
companies for which appearing well managed is important for maintaining autonomy and
even survival (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens 2005). Finally, accounting change may simply be
necessary to preserve the appearance of rationality and control of powerful individuals
(Burns and Scapens, 2000).
Although the importance of external pressures, legitimizing, mimicking and regulatory
changes are widely accepted as the initiators of MAC, it has been argued that they alone do
not sufficiently explain how change has come to take place. Instead, management accounting
practices can arise due to extra-organizational influences interlinking with internal
circumstances (Vaivio, 1999) as processes of accounting change are likely subject to various
organizational pressures and rationales (Scapens and Burns 1993). Therefore, managerial
practices such as -determined by the external environment as well as the
internal dynamics of organizations (Valuckas, 2018). Siti-Nabiha and Scapens (2005)
conclude that complex internal dynamics can shape processes of change and can lead to an
outcome that is different from intended.
For example, Liguori and Steccolini (2011) showed that while environmental pressures and
regulatory requirements were the initial motivations for the change, they were not enough to
lead to revolutionary change on their own. Instead, the interaction of intra-organizational
factors played significant role in the change process and its outcome. Especially, the way in
which external pressures are filtered by the intraorganizational dynamics and factors is
relevant. This was further emphasized by the differing outcomes of MAC of two
organizations facing similar environmental pressures. (Liquori and Steccolini, 2011).
Meanwhile, Granlund (2001) highlighted that even in the face of financial distress and
general acceptance that MAS needs to be changed, the change finally failed to be
implemented due to internal factors. Therefore, are variously
facilitated, moderated or defeated by internal institutional dynamics (Parker, 2012).
2.2 Innes and Mitchell (1990) to Kasurinen (2002)
Innes and Mitchell (1990) argue that prior to their study, the process of MAC has received
very little attention in research. Through analyzing management accounting change as a
process in seven companies, they identified and classified three sets of factors based on their
nature and timing in driving MAC. These factors are motivators, facilitators and catalysts. It
is through the interaction of these factors that management accounting change can take place.
(Innes and Mitchell, 1990)
Figure 1. Innes and Mitchell (1990) model.
According to Innes and Michell (1990), the first set, the motivators, include the factors that
were influencing the MAC more generally. In line with claims that MAC is influenced by
external factors, they identified the increased competition in the market and developments
in production technology as motivators (Innes and Mitchell, 1990). Cobb et al. (1995)
expanded that a mismatch between the environment of the organization and the MAS create
a tension that puts pressure for the MAS to change. Therefore, this mismatch, a gap, serves
as a motivator (Cobb et al, 1995). The motivators make managers realize need the for change
(Munir et al. 2013).
In addition to the external motivators identified by Innes and Mitchell 1990, studies using
the model have identified multiple external motivators such as increased competition (Innes
and Mitchell, 1990; Cobb et al, 1995; Kasurinen 2002; Munir et al, 2013), product
innovations (Cobb et al. 1995), increasing complexity of business environment (Kasurinen,
2002), uncertain economic conditions and regulatory changes (Munir et al. 2013). However,
contrary to other studies, Valuckas (2018) found that the MAC was motivated by the relative
market stability as the management willingness to try new practices emerged. Meanwhile,
the successes of another company in the same field in adopting same practices worked to
legitimize the practice and motivated its adoption (Valuckas, 2018).
While external environment and pressures (or lack of them) are shown to motivate MAC,
the studies using the model have identified internal motivators to play a crucial role. For
example, in addition to product cost structure (Innes and Mitchell, 1990), Cobb et al. (1995)
identified internal environment related pressures such as decreasing profitability and
information needs such as cost structure and product profitability as motivators. Meanwhile,
Kasurinen (2002) highlighted the mature stage of product portfolio and overtly financially
oriented control system as influential internal motivators. On the other hand, Vaivio (1999)
added that motivators can also be related to need to understand internal operations nature,
issues and performance. In other words, the need for increased visibility and understanding
The second set of factors are the necessary underlying conditions for the change to take place
but are by themselves not enough for the change to take place. They observed adequate
accounting staff, computing resources and authority of accounting function as facilitators
(Innes and Mitchell, 1990). Similarly, appropriate and adequate resources with regard to
human resource and technology were found by Cobb et al (1995) to serve as influential
facilitators. The role of adequate systems was also highlighted by Munir et al. (2013) who
found that the new information system and automatization of performance measures as well
as knowledge how to present measures facilitated the adoption of the new MAS while
appropriate technical support also played a role.
On the other hand, Kasurinen (2002) found the pre-existing introduction of BSC as facilitator
through having legitimized the concept to some members in the organization. Similarly,
Vaivio (1999) suggested that the initial non-financial measurements facilitated the more
systematic and comprehensive adoption of non-financial measures. Meanwhile, Munir et al.
(2013) emphasize the role of the change leader in setting up the facilitators of change such
as setting up a task force as well as hiring like-minded managers and a consultant. Finally,
Valuckas (2018), highlighted the role of top management support as an important facilitator.
He found that once the top management support for the project stopped, the change effort
was also halted and eventually abandoned.
The third set are classified as the incidents that were directly related and occurred in close
proximity to the observed changes, the catalysts (Innes and Mitchell, 1990). While
motivators alert the management to the need of change, catalysts provide important insight
to when the changes will actually take place and what needs to be done to initiate change
(Munir et al., 2013).
Their research revealed loss of market share, arrival of new accountant and deteriorating
profitability as catalysts of MAC (Innes and Mitchell, 1990). Similarly, Vaivio (1999)
suggested that the sudden changes in economic environment and resulting falling
profitability and increased competition served as the final catalyst for the MAC. In addition
to former, individuals can serve as catalyst as pressure for results from powerful individuals
can serve as a catalyst (Cobb et al, 1995).
In similar fashion, Munir et al. (2013) found that the initial catalyst for the management
accounting change was the liberalization of financial markets and falling profitability.
Profitability was deteriorating duet non-performing loans and constant government
interferences and demands lead to rising administrative costs. Liberalization of financial
markets resulted in loss of market share as more business-oriented banks entered the market.
Furthermore, the government made regulatory changes for which compliance required
changes to existing MAS. The final major catalyst was the election of new BOD and
president consisting mainly of private sector finance professionals. These factors happened
close to the change and were directly related to the change. (Munir et al., 2013)
However, somewhat differently to the mainly financial, regulatory and personnel change
related catalysts, Kasurinen (2002) expanded that the knowledge and understanding about
the strategic plans that the BSC should be linked that had been gained by the general manager
through participation in planning rendered the project possible. The implementation of the
BSC was the logical step to increase the role of strategic planning in the organization and
therefore, this acquired knowledge and understanding finally catalyzed the project
(Kasurinen, 2002).
Innes and Mitchell (1990) argue that it is only through the interaction of all these external
and internal factors that change can take place. The facilitators are not enough to result in
MAC and the motivators and catalysts only become effective at generating change when
sufficient facilitating factors are in place. They continued that although the motivators and
catalysts act positively to create change, the change can only materialize when facilitating
factors are in place. (Innes and Mitchell, 1990).
Cobb et al. (1995) argue that even though the Innes and Mitchell (1990) model is strong on
external elements such as the environment, it is weak in showing the process of change that
takes place within the organization. Especially, the model ignores the process of MAC as
social accomplishment through human agency. Although it can recognize individuals as
catalysts, it does not accommodate the perceived dual role of individuals as catalysts and
leaders of change and the importance of leaders in overcoming barriers. Finally, they suggest
that the very momentum of change, the accumulation of changes and expectation of
continuing change itself serve as powerful factor in driving the change. They conclude that
even though motivators, catalysts and facilitators may be necessary to create a potential for
change, individuals, the leaders, are necessary to overcome the barriers and momentum is
required to maintain the speed of change. Therefore, Cobb et al (1995) have revised the
model brought forward by Innes and Mitchell (1990):
Figure 2. Cobb et al. (1995) revised model
Munir et al. (2013) showed that the president who was a major catalyst for change, also acted
as the leader and creator of momentum for change. The president removed long serving
executives who were perceived to be potential barriers and replaced them by like-minded
people who would end up serving as opinion leaders in the change effort. The president
constantly pressed the need for change to the opinion leaders and exchanged ideas with them.
The opinion leaders would then communicate these ideas further down the line and
contributed towards creating acceptance of the changes in the employees. (Munir et al.,
2013)
The dual role of leader and catalyst is further supported by Valuckas (2018). However, he
found that the efforts of one leader was not enough to overcome the barriers of change.
promoting and communicating the change until the change is fully implemented.
Furthermore, he argues that the leaders act as intermediaries of change. They diffuse the
ideas behind the change and the new practice around the organization therefore facilitating
the change effort in practice. (Valuckas, 2018)
Despite the perceived importance of leaders in MAC process, studies have not used
leadership styles to explain process of management accounting change (Jansen 2011).
According to him, leadership styles can be divided into transformational and transactional.
Transformational leadership style appeals to socio-emotional needs and aims at motivating
employees by communicating values, beliefs and mission on of the company in an
interactive style and through involvement. Transactional leadership appeals to physical
needs and aims at motivating employees by contingent rewards while constraining choices
and actions. Transactional leadership is largely inactive and focuses on management by
exception. Although he highlights that appropriate leadership style even in change efforts is
somewhat reliant on the needs and expectations of the employees, he finds transformational
leadership style to be more effective in especially more radical MAC that deeply challenges
the pre-existing ways of doing things. Jansen (2011)
To further support, Liguori and Steccolini (2011) found that the transformational leadership
style and personal characteristics of the change leader was integral to the revolutionary
changes to be implemented. Involving, discussing and commitment seeking leadership style
ensured that personnel understood the need for changes and promoted commitment to the
change process. However, transactional and symbolic leadership style was not sufficient for
ensuring commitment to changes and as such, only evolutionary and incremental changes
followed. (Liguori and Steccolini, 2011). Similarly, Yazdifar et al. (2008) also emphasize
the importance of communication, interaction and involvement as key factors in promoting
commitment and ownership to the revolutionary MAC.
However, while supporting the importance of leaders, Vaivio (1999) argued that it was the
systematic approach and focused use of interactive controls by the new leader that was the
key factor that finally brought about the changes in contrast to the earlier unsystematic efforts
that had failed. The change leader set up a design team that identified appropriate measures
by using techniques such as fish bone chart and finally formed a recurring report. Moreover,
these measures would then be systematically followed up in meetings and acted upon
resulting in real changes in managerial processes that lead to new forms of accountability
and successful, comprehensive MAC. (Vaivio, 1999). To further support, Liguori and
Steccolini (2011) found that turning to an uncoordinated way of introducing new systems
slowed down the diffusion of new practices in the case company.
Finally, Kasurinen (2002) found that the implementation process significantly halted once
 Meanwhile, Valuckas (2018) noted
that the reassignment of the change leader lead to change effort halting.
Cobb et al (1995) argue that even together, these factors might not be enough to result in
MAC. They highlight that the Innes and Mitchell (1990) model fails to account for barriers
factors that can hinder, delay or altogether prevent change. Their findings show that for
example attitudes of staff, changes in personnel as well as changing priorities can serve as
barriers that prevent change even when facilitators, motivators and catalysts are in place.
(Cobb et al., 1995)
However, Kasurinen (2002) argues that even though Cobb et al. (1995) have successfully
identified the advancing and hindering forces of change, further categorization of the barriers
could make the barriers role in the change process more recognizable and help the
organizations in their attempt to avoid them in practice. Therefore, he has proposed the
categorization of the barriers as confusers, frustrators and delayers. In addition, he also
further streamlined the model by classifying the motivators, facilitators, catalysts, leaders
and momentum as the advancing forces and barriers as the hindering forces of change
(Kasurinen, 2002).
Figure 3. Kasurinen (2002) revised model
In his case study, Kasurinen (2002) found that the accounting change faced uncertain future
after the division manager, the leader, left the company. Furthermore, the division
management started imposing their strategic views and indicators, at the expense of the
business managers operational views, upon the business units and this created uncertainty
over the real owner and goals of the change. These uncertainties and differing views create
confusion and as such, these barriers are classified as confusers (Kasurinen, 2002). Similarly,
Valuckas (2018) argued that the dissolution of the transition team created uncertainty about
the future of the projects and as such, was a major confuser.
Munir et al. (2013) found that even though there was no public strong resistance to the PMS
and the reasoning for the changes were widely accepted. The branch managers who were
affected by the new MAS were confused how the new system would affect their bonuses
and promotions. In the previous system promotions and bonuses were based on tenure rather
than performance. Additionally, the rapid introduction of many initiatives and lack of
communication and training created confusion among employees. Finally, the prior failed
change attempts to the old system meant that the employees were not sure how seriously the
latest attempt should be taken. (Munir et al., 2013)
The second set of barriers are classified as frustrators (Kasurinen, 2002). This set of barriers
consist of the factors such as culture and existing structures that work towards suppressing
the change attempt in the organization. For instance, in his case study, the frustrators
included the business unit managers  fears that the divisionally designed systems would not
meet local requirements as well as the engineering culture that emphasized diagnostic
measurement over the division
2002). In addition to organizational culture, Valuckas (2018) highlighted that national
culture can serve as a frustrator for accounting change.
On the other hand, Munir et al. (2013) found that some of the more senior employees still
had faith in the old system and the new system was seen as top management initiative and
therefore created frustration. Later, the new PMS system was found to be slow and
maintaining it time consuming. This was a major source of frustration for the employees.
However, according to Munir et al. (2013), this frustrator later became a catalyst for further
change in the MAS revealing the interchangeable nature of the hindering and advancing
forces of change in relation to time.
The final set of barriers have been classified as delayers and according Kasurinen (2002),
these are often technical and temporary in nature. In his study, he found that the lack of clear-
cut strategies to be translated into indicators as well as problems in data gathering due to
inadequate information systems were hindering the change process. These barriers resulted
in the change process being delayed (Kasurinen, 2002). Meanwhile, Valuckas (2018)
expanded that the general understanding of the practice being implemented and multiplicity
of goals can also delay the implementation of the practice.
When using the Kasurinen (2002) change model, it is important to recognize that the element
of potential for change and barriers identified by research are not further categorization but
rather their position in those specific circumstances. For example, Cobb et al. (1995) found
falling profitability to be a general motivator for change while Munir et.al (2013) and Vaivio
(1999) argued that falling profitability was one of the factors that finally catalyzed the MAC.
The reason for different classification is due to the nature of influence and timing of the
factor. In Cobb et.al (1995) study the falling profitability raised the awareness for need to
change but was not among the final triggers while in Vaivio  (1999) and Munir et al. (2013)
studies it was among the final triggers that initiated change.
The second important aspect of the model is the interplay of internal and external factors and
their interchangeability in relation to time. As the studies using the model show, management
accounting change and its outcome is a result of external forces and internal dynamics
interacting during the process. Moreover, the studies also reveal the interchangeability over
time of the advancing forces among themselves as well as with the barriers. For example,
Munir et.al (2013) found the inadequate systems to be initially a frustrator but as time passed,
it was the inadequacy of the system that served as a catalyst for the subsequent MAC.
Finally, the studies using the model highlighted the role that leaders have on the MAC
process by taking multiple roles. The leaders were found to serve as catalysts (Cobb et al.,
1995; Munir et al., 2013; Valuckas, 2018), putting facilitators in place (Munir et al., 2013)
as well as creating and maintaining momentum for change (Cobb et al., 1995; Vaivio, 1999;
Kasurinen, 2002; Munir et al., 2013; Valuckas 2018). The importance of the leader was
further highlighted by the change getting halted once the leader was removed from the
change (Kasurinen, 2002; Valuckas, 2018).
Although the Kasurinen (2002) model has successfully expanded the barriers factor and
multiple potential barriers have been identified by Kasurinen (2002) as well as later studies
using the model, the sources of resistance and stability that contribute to barriers remain
largely unexplored by these studies. Therefore, the next chapter will present the sources of
resistance stability found in the MAC literature.
2.3 Management accounting stability and resistance to change
Resistance to MAC and stability  is widely known but poorly understood and only
limited amount of studies have analyzed this further (Granlund, 2001), and only few attempts
have been made to explain the dynamics that promote inertia in management accounting
change (van der Steen, 2009). Granlund (2001), continues that number of studies using
statistical methods have identified factors that contribute to stability. However, while factors
that generally contribute stability can potentially be identified, the problem remains that the
number of factors is in inevitably unlimited and in the end fail to account for complexity of
different incentives and aspirations of actors in management accounting change. (Granlund,
2001).
However, stability and change are not mutually exclusive processes but can instead occur
simultaneously. Moreover, when encountering environmental changes, stability of MAS can
be essential for understanding and making sense of organizational activity. (Burns and
scapens, 2000). In addition, it is also argued that the stability of MAS can be essential for
avoiding disruptions in operational performance (Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007; Siti-Nabiha
and Scapens, 2005). Furthermore, through their research Siti-Nabiha and Scapens (2005)
expand that in order to maintain stability of values and norms within the subunit as well as
the relationship with parent company, ceremonial change of new accounting systems was
necessary. Finally, this stability then provided the conditions for subsequent instrumental
MAC. However, the resulting MAC lacked some of the intended features and effects of the
initial change attempt and instead mirrored the pre-existing values and norms (Siti-Nabiha
and Scapens, 2005).
In line with Burns and Scapens (2000) argument, Lukka (2007) suggests that stability and
change can co-exist through loose coupling. However, whereas Burns and Scapnes (2000)
suggest that stability is a result of the informal procedures, the routines, providing stability
when the formal rules are changed, Lukka (2007) argues that flexibility in routines can allow
the rules to remain unchanged. Similarly, Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) continue that loose
coupling creates a buffer between formal structures and daily activities from changes in
external environment. Therefore, allowing the formal MAS to change while maintaining the
stability of the actual daily activities of the organization (Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007).
However, while Lukka (2007) sees loose coupling as solution to work around problematic
rules, Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) perceive it as a process and outcome of resistance to
change.
In similar fashion to Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007), Granlund (2001) found that the
accumulation of resistance to the MAC lead to momentum of stability. However, instead of
leading to loose coupling, his study revealed that as the economic, institutional and human
factors driving stability gain momentum and start dominating the forces of change, the
cumulative effect of inertia can reach a point where change effort is abandoned. In addition
to suggesting change and stability to be counterforces as well as existence of momentum for
stability, Granlund (2001) study shows there can also be leader of stability. In his study, a
senior accountant was able to convince other colleagues as well as superiors that the prosed
change was undesirable and unnecessary. Hence, his role can be described as leader of
stability.
The following three chapters will present the literature findings on resistance to management
accounting change.
Burns and Scapens (2000) view management accounting systems as a set of rules and
routines. From this basis, they have developed a framework to study management accounting
change. They view management accounting as routine organizational practice that has
acting
in a specific organization. The central idea to their framework is that these taken for granted
ways of thinking are embedded and reproduced in the accounting rules, the way things
should be done , and routines, the way things are actually done . (Burns and Scapens,
2000).
Although Burns and Scapens (2000) framework is intended for exploring and explaining
management accounting change, they accept that management accounting routines and the
taken for granted assumptions are sources of stability. The inherent stability of routines and
difficulty of changing the taken for granted assumptions has since been accepted by multiple
studies using Burns and Scapens (2000) framework, its derivatives and concepts (Quinn,
2014; Busco et al., 2006; Granlund, 2011; Lukka, 2007; van der Steen, 2011; Nor-Aziah and
Scapens, 2007; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). According to Quinn (2014), some
accounting routines can be stable to the extent that they can remain essentially unchanged
for over a century.
 As a
result of introduction of new rules that are incompatible with existing rules and routines,
people are inclined to retain or revert to existing behavior to maintain ontological security
(van der Steen, 2009).
Burns (2000) argues that accounting change where the new ways of thinking are not
congruent the existing ones, is likely to meet resistance. Burns and Scapens (2000) expand
that the resistance to MAC resulted from the new accounting-based rules and routines not
being congruent with the pre-existing dominant rules, routines and ways of thinking.
Similarly, accounting change that is imposed on the managers and challenges the prevailing
way of thinking and doing and is therefore resisted and finally, can lead to the old routines
persisting (Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007).
Any MAC taking place will likely be influenced by existing routines and taken for granted
assumptions (Burns and Scapens, 2000). Therefore, the new emerging MAS might not be
optimal based on efficiency criteria but is likely to present a satisfactory compromise
solution and attempts to introduce revolutionary change is likely to follow evolutionary and
path dependent process (Burns and Scapens, 2000). However, Siti-Nabiha and Scapens
(2005) argue that such evolutionary compromising change can lead to ceremonial or
symbolic changes that serve legitimizing purposes rather than having instrumental effect.
Only ceremonially implemented accounting systems can be viewed to be decoupled from
actual daily activities (Lukka 2007; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). Burns (2000) further
emphasizes that such decoupled, mechanical accounting routines and practices that have
little managerial and operational implications are relatively easy to achieve but due to
symbolic nature, do not have desired impact and implications. As Valuckas (2018) found,
the old budgeting routines were not changed during the change process and prevailed under
a new name, forecasting. Such symbolic changes made into the MAS may not be enough to
change the sticky routines (Valuckas, 2018).
While researchers have mainly emphasized existing accounting and other organizational
routines as the hindering force of change, Van der Steen (2009) identified a stability routine
which manifested itself through downplaying of the formal rule changes as the objects of the
changes had opposing view on the need for change. The employees had a strong believe that
the financial performance was satisfactory and disregarded, questioned and downplayed the
opposing arguments presented by consultants and managers. He further argues that this
questioning of differing views on performance had become a standard practice and coping
mechanism within the organization and therefore, a stability routine. (van der Steen, 2009)
Organizations can be seen as mini-societies that have cultures and subcultures (Kasurinen,
2002). Busco and Scapens (2011) define organizational culture as socially constructed and
validated pattern of shared assumptions which have been developed by a specific group of
individuals. Thus, organizational culture is the shared taken for granted assumptions, values
and beliefs of an organization (Busco and Scapens, 2011). Attempts to implement
management accounting change can be frustrated by cultural infrastructure of the
organization (Kasurinen, 2002). In order for management accounting change to take place,
the existing incompatible culture needs to be unlearned (Busco and Scapens, 2011).
However, people are likely to resist unlearning as it is highly uncomfortable and produces
anxiety. Therefore, cultural changes are likely to be met with resistance. (Busco and Scapens,
2011).
Van der Steen (2009) found that the existing organizational culture did not emphasize
accountability and as such, the introductions of new accounting rules intended to promote
accountability were rejected by the employees. The organization had a culture of not
confronting others with bad performance as it was commonly seen as an intrusion onto
personal space and denial of their valuable position. Therefore, the new management
accounting and performance measurement system promoting accountability was largely
ignored and branded insignificant. (Van der Steen, 2009). Formal management accounting
change that challenges the organizations culture profoundly can lead to pre-existing beliefs
and values prevailing and decoupling of management accounting practices from daily
managerial activities (Wahyudi, 2009).
While organizational cultures can cause resistance and hinder accounting change, also the
wider societal culture needs to be considered. For example, Valuckas (2018) found that the
wider societal culture in the Baltic region was not suitable for the planned MAC as the
required level of autonomy was not seen feasible at the time due to the level of maturity of
the market and society. On the other hand, in cultures where hierarchies are high and
questioning of the superiors is not common practice, formal and overt resistance might not
be observed but this does not mean that there is no resistance to change as instead, resistance
might still exist as informal resistance (Munir et al. 2013).
In addition to resistance rising from organizational culture and routines, the need for
accounting change can be questioned due to perceived state of the organization and its
systems. Liguori and Steccolini (2011) argued that resistance was stemming from managers
being content with the current systems and therefore could not see the reason to change. The
rationales for implementing the new accounting tools and the tools themselves were not
understood (Liguori and Steccolini, 2011). Similarly, Lukka (2007) showed that the subunit
felt that their systems are serving their needs and are superior to the systems that were to be
implemented and as such, did not see the need for change. Meanwhile, Kasurinen (2002)
highlighted that the current profitability and performance of the company was good and
therefore, change was not seen necessary by the employees. Finally, Van der Steen (2008)
argues that high market share and profit margins had led to complacency. There was a shared
believe that the performance of the company was optimal. This believe was so strong that
when new MAS showed contradicting results, its results were rejected (Van der Steen,
2009).
Finally, Burns and Scapens (2000) conclude that the more widely the taken for granted ways
are accepted, the more likely there is going to be resistance to change.
Burns and Scapens (2000) suggest that accounting change resistance can be due to lack of
capability and inability to implement new systems. Liguori and Steccolini (2011) continue
that when managers lack understanding of the accounting systems being put in place, they
are likely to not see their benefits and as such, lack commitment to change and fail to use
the implemented systems. Meanwhile, Siti-Nabiha and Scapens (2005) found that the
operational managers lacked financial skills and prior experience of designing indicators and
therefore had difficulty in translating their activities into performance measures. Moreover,
there was a feeling that the financial indicators could not reflect the complexity of their roles
(Siti-Nabiha and Scapens. 2005). However, resistance can also originate from managers
viewing the accountants lacking sufficient knowledge over operations to incorporate that in
the financial targets (Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007).
Lack of capability and understanding can result in middle management serving as a buffer
blocking the intended change from having desired impact on their subordinates resulting in
mainly symbolic accounting change (Burns, 2000). Liguori and Steccolini (2011) on the
other hand see concentration of power and technical abilities to only to a specialized work
group such finance department to work as a filter for environmental disturbance from
initiating MAC in other parts of the organization, therefore barring the MAC. As such,
Liguori and Steccolini (2011) suggest that diffused technical accounting capabilities help
accommodate radical MAC whereas concentrated capabilities are likely to hinder change.
Sacpens and Roberts (1993) argue that resistance can also rise from fear that centrally
designed, distant MAS does not meet the local needs of units. Distant systems promote
rational and abstract thinking for managers concerned with general conditions and trends
whereas local systems focus on specific conditions. Centrally designed common systems
embrace the idea of commonality to increase comparability and control over multiple units.
However, commonality is not important for local managers who desire systems designed to
their individual needs. (Scapens and Roberts ,1993). To further support, Kasurinen (2002)
also found that there were fears that the system designed at divisional level would not meet
the local requirements. Yazdifar et al. (2008) continue that when the imposed reporting does
not meet the requirements of the organization, the managers rely on other sources of
information and therefore the formal reporting becomes decoupled from actual working
activities.
In some cases, the appropriateness of the MAS being implemented can be also questioned.
For example, in Granlund (2001) study the operational managers questioned the suitability
of ABC due to the complexity caused by large amount of products and joint costs as well
internal cross selling while senior accounting described such allocations as penny splitting.
Furthermore, the inadequacy of the accounting system may lead to only symbolic accounting
change that serves the purpose of legitimizing rather than having any managerial and
operational implications (Yazdifar et al., 2008). Meanwhile, Granlund (2001) highlights that
prior negative experiences with the system being implemented can result in employees being
predisposed to rejecting the system and therefore resisting its implementation. However,
prior negative experiences with change and current systems can also make employees more
accepting of future change and therefore, limit resistance (Yazdifar et al. 2008).
Granlund
counting orientation can lead to inertia. Furthermore, he suggests that the educational
background and diligence required in financial accounting profession might make
accountants mo  Similarly, Nor-Aziah and Scapens
(2007) emphasize that the accountants were not able to change their role from bookkeeping
emphasize timely payments and routine reports instead of financial advisor. Moreover, their
lack of operational experience also contributed to their lack of legitimacy in the eyes of
operational managers and therefore hindered their capability to act as change agents. Nor-
Aziah and Scapens, 2007). On the other hand, Siti-Nabiha and Scapens (2005) argue that
management accountants lacked stature and influence which is typical in production-
oriented organization and were excluded from operative matters by production managers.
Similarly, Scapens and Roberts (1993) found that the accountants were viewed to lack
stature and understanding of the differing requirements of the units and therefore their role
in implementing the change gave rise to resentment.
2.3.3 Power, special interests and conflicting rationales
Accounting and control systems collect and manipulate information used in decision
making, direct the performance of individuals and outcomes of organizational processes.
They initiate action as well as are used to legitimize group and individual actions. As such,
accounting and control systems have impact on resource allocation, career progression and
organizational structure. Therefore, they are tightly connected to the power distribution and
use of power within the organization. (Kasurinen, 2002)
Burns and Scapens (2000) highlight the importance of use of power in MAC. Key
individuals that have sufficient power over resources, may be able to resist or subvert the
change process (Burns and Scapens, 2000). Yazdifar et al. (2008) continue that powerful
individuals can withhold accounting information for their own benefit and use their power
to build empires. Granlund (2001) concludes that some individuals just have more power to
influence others and through skillful employment of this power, they can resist accounting
change. For example, using Hardy (1996) power model, Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007)
suggested that the accountants implementing the change lacked power over decision making
and meaning that are important for implementing management accounting change.
Meanwhile, it was also in the interest of operational managers to maintain existing ways of
doing. Therefore, they used their power over knowledge to resist the MAC (Nor-Aziah and
Scapens, 2007). On the other hand, Wahyudi (2009) argues that when the use of power over
resources is perceived unfair and mainly used to establish dominance, it can lead to conflicts,
erosion of trust and emergence of resistance.
Power struggle between other organizational departments and accounting in MAC has been
documented in multiple studies where focus is on increasing financial accountability through
management accounting change. Scapens and Roberts (1993) found that accounting change
was viewed as central interference in the subunit operations. The unit managers felt that the
division accountants driving the change were in fact extending divisional control over the
units through which the division would gain more
control over subunit operations and as such, this created a fear that the units would lose
autonomy. Furthermore, the different professional groups were unable to find common
language which increased the us versus them attitude. (Scapens and Roberts, 1993)
Similarly, Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) highlighted the tensions between accountants and
operational managers as well as lack of common technical language as a major cause for the
failure of the MAC promoting financial accountability. Introduction of accountants was seen
as an imposition and an attempt to expand accountants empire instead of aiding them in
operations. Furthermore, they argue that due to their traditional operational focus, the
managers prioritized meeting the operational targets instead of the often conflicting cost
targets. Therefore, the operations managers viewed the increased financial accountability
and accountants as a threat to their autonomy and operative performance. (Nor-Aziah and
Scapens, 2007). However, on the contrary, Granlund (2001) suggests that the failure to find
common ground and the power struggle might not always be between different professional
groups or departments. Instead, he highlighted that such power struggle can occur within the
accounting personnel themselves.
Merchant and van der Stede (2017) argue that managers should be held accountable for only
what they can control. Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) highlighted that implementation of
inadequate top-down budgets created feeling that the budget was imposed on them. As a
result, the managers did not feel accountable for the budgets and lacked commitment to
achieve them (Nor Aziah and Scapens, 2007). Moreover, being held accountable for
impossible targets does not motivate better performance (van der Steen, 2009). In further
support, Scapens and Roberts (1993) found that decentralization to divisional structure was
ambiguous as divisional managers were responsible for the profitability while many
activities were still controlled centrally. However, the accounting systems such as cost and
profit centers which were aligned to the formal structure and as such, did not follow decision
making patterns. Therefore, the managers did not have full power over their performance
although they were held accountable for it. Being held accountable for uncontrollable factors
gave rise to resentment and resistance to the change. (Scapens and Roberts, 1993).
Busco et al (2006) suggest that trust is central to MAC. In order to have successful MAS
implementation, there needs to be trust for accounting t in the
management accounting system itself. On the other hand, MAS can also be the source of
trust. They argue that introduction of MAS  can participate in creating trust for change
trough providing the tools and context to understand and deal with wider organizational
change. They labelled this as accounting for trust . However, if there is no trust for
accounting  and accounting for trust  is attempted, the accounting can become
marginalized and even the focus of the resistance to change. (Busco et al., 2006)
Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) also highlighted lack of trust as a central hindering force to
management accounting change. They argue that lack of trust between the accountants
imposing the change and operational managers contributed to the abandonment of the
budgets and increased financial accountability. The MAC and increased control was often
perceived unfair and as questioning of their professional judgement and as such, made
managers feel that they were not trusted. On the other hand, the operational managers did
not trust accountants competencies and did not accept imposed MAS, the budgets, due to
fearing that such acceptance would lead to being accountable to them. Not being trusted
resulted in not trusting the accountants. (Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007). Similarly,
Johansson and Baldvinsdottir (2003) argue that management accounting change is only
possible when there is trust in the management accounting systems and their use. Immediate
rejection of accounting figures is likely when there is a suspicion that they will be used
against. Furthermore, they highlight the importance of trust carriers as trust in the system
can be gained through the trust in individuals implementing the change (Johansson and
Baldvinsdottir, 2003). Finally, resistance to management change can be eased if there is trust
in the expertise of the individuals implementing the change (Busco et al, 2006).
 powerful
arguments of efficiency and economic gains, any resistance to the change can seem
irrational. However, when viewed from another angle, such resistance can instead appear
rational. For example, the senior accountant resisting the change was concerned losing his
influence and control, but he was also concerned that the new practice would not be suitable
to the company as well as that it would increase workload for his department without
subsequent benefit. From this point of view, the resistance can be viewed as rational.
(Granlund, 2001). Similarly, Scapens and Roberts (1993) argued that resistance encountered
in the MAC was viewed irrational by the project team implementing the change. However,
the resistance was grounded in real concerns over suitability of the system. These concerns
were strengthened by the fact that managers would be held accountable for their performance
based on outputs of this system.
More generally, management accounting change is viewed differently by different employee
groups. For top management, change is often an opportunity whereas for employees and
middle management change is not desirable nor welcome (Kasurinen, 2002). For example,
performance measurement systems are linked to incentives and as such, changes to them
will have effect on how bonuses and promotions are allocated (Munir et al., 2013). On the
other hand, resistance to management accounting can also arise from increased visibility that
threatens the slack of the organization (Malmi, 1997). Finally, new management accounting
systems can also reveal some operations to be unprofitable and some jobs to be unnecessary
and therefore, lead to relocations and redundancies (van der Steen, 2009; Munir et al., 2013;
Cobb et al., 1995). Therefore, as employees roles are likely to be altered as a result of the
change, it is unreasonable to expect that they would buy into the changes unless managers
adequately explain the changes and gain acceptance to them from the employees (Kasurinen,
2002).
Revolutionary MAC that profoundly challenges the existing routines and institutions is more
likely to encounter resistance than evolutionary change that is consistent with existing
routines and institutions (Burns and Scapens, 2000). Multiple studies have shown that
revolutionary MAC is difficult to achieve (Granlund, 2001; Nor-Aziah and Scapens; Siti-
Nabiha and Scapens; Kasurinen, 2002; Valuckas 2018; Scapens and Roberts; 1993).
However, while difficult to achieve, a strand of studies have shown that revolutionary MAC
does take place (Vaivio 1999; Busco and Scapens, 2011; Yazdifar et al, 2008; Liguori and
Steccolini, 2011). Therefore, this chapter will go over the findings of what is required for
revolutionary accounting change to take place.
Burns and Scapens (2000) argue that managing MAC requires a thorough understanding the
organizational contexts especially with regard to its routines and taken for granted
assumptions. Successful implementation can be achieved by understanding the ways of
thinking and doing things (Yazdifar et al., 2008). Furthermore, it requires questioning of the
underlying assumptions behind day to day activities (Burns and Scapens, 2000). Yazdifar et
al. (2008) continue that constantly highlighting the need and benefits of the change, the taken
for granted ways of working and are increasingly questioned and new ways and systems can
be implemented instead. However, while questioning the underlying assumptions is
important for radical MAC, Busco and Scapens (2011) suggest that MA
tool in revolutionary organizational change and the means by which the old culture is
and value neutral tools but are rather embedded deep in the taken for granted assumptions,
 (Busco and Scapens, 2011).
Furthermore, in order to overcome resistance to revolutionary MAC, Busco and Scapens
(2011) suggest that the old culture and taken for granted assumption have to be unfrozen.
They
mechanisms of disconfirmation, the creation of survival anxiety and creation of
communication, training and implementation of new techniques lead to disconfirming and
questioning the taken for granted assumptions, created a fear for loss of employment, stature
and career progression while promoting new values lead to unlearning the old ways and
provided a path to psychological safety through accepting the new ways. This unfreezing of
the organization paves the path to successful revolutionary change to a culture of
performance measurement and accountability. (Busco and Scapens, 2011)
Similarly, Yazdifar et al. (2008) argue that while ensuring understanding and highlighting
importance of the changes are important, there needs to be a threat to job security in order
to drive the radical changes through in a democratic yet autocratic way. In support, van der
Steen (2009) noted that the process of behavioral change did not take place by introduction
of accounting rules, MAS, alone and
existing routines, the ways of working, behaving and thinking. To further support, Yazdifar
et al. (2008) found that where the old ways were not taken for granted but rather symbolic
and decoupled they did not have to be unfrozen in order to facilitate MAC. Rather
interestingly, while van der Steen (2009) and Granlund (2001) argued that a threat to
ontological security can give rise to resistance, Yazdifar et al. (2008) and Busco & Scapens
(2011) highlighted that this very threat to ontological security is needed in achieving
revolutionary accounting change.
Liguori and Steccolini (2011) argue that concentrated power and dispersed capabilities are
necessary, while interests and value commitment are also fundamental for ensuring
successful radical MAC. Busco and Scapens (2011) stress the importance of training as
means of diffusing knowledge, information and skills. Liguori and Steccolini (2011)
continue that communication through training and use of informal channels promote
understanding of the new systems and develop technical capabilities to use the systems and
increase commitment to change. Furthermore, showing employees how the information of
the system can be used and providing them with sufficient training encourages them to take
ownership of the change (Yazdifar et al., 2008). Busco and Scapen (2011) add that
involvement in implementation of new systems and requiring meeting targets with them is a
powerful way to show the importance of the new system and culture to the employees. When
employees recognize the benefits of the new system, they become much more amenable to
the changes (Munir et al. 2013).
Meanwhile, Burns (2000) highlighted the importance of politics and power mobilization in
facilitating accounting change. He showed that use of power over resources, meaning and
decision making, change is likely to happen and at least lead to establishment of new
mechanical routines. However, he continues that the application of power has to be
continuous as a break down in application is likely to result in abandonment of the change
when the local power over system, the set ways of thinking and doing are strongly rooted.
Yazfidar et al. (2008) continue that exercising power over resources, decision-making and
meaning can be used to legitimize and rationalize MAC to make it appear acceptable and
desirable.
In addition, many authors have highlighted the importance of leaders in undertaking
revolutionary MAC efforts (Cobb et al., 1995; Vaivio, 1999; Kasurinen, 2002; Liguori and
Steccolini, 2011; Munir et al, 2013; Valuckas, 2018; Jansen, 2011). Furthermore, it has been
suggested that transformational leadership style is more effective in MAC efforts (Jansen,
2011; Liguori and Steccolini, 2011) and systematic and coordinated approach should be
applied to successfully implement revolutionary MAC (Vaivio, 1999; Liguori and
Steccolini, 2011). Therefore, organizations preparing for revolutionary MAC should be
prepared to invest in adequate leader of change (Munir et al., 2013). However, the change
leader is not always part of the top management and as such, Granlund (2001) highlights the
importance of top management support as he found that lack of it can contribute greatly to
the eventual failure of implementation.
Finally, Kasurinen (2002) suggests that analyzing the influencing forces of change using the
revised Kasurinen (2002) model at early stages of the change project could help
organizations to circumvent barriers in practice and increase likelihood of successful
revolutionary MAC.
3 Methodology
The field research is conducted as a qualitative single case study. The following chapter will
discuss the methodology and pitfalls of qualitative case studies and explains why this method
has been adopted.
Case studies can be classified as descriptive, illustrative, experimental, exploratory and
explanatory (Scapens, 1990). Descriptive case studies aim at providing a description of
accounting in practice. Illustrative case studies aim at illustrating new or innovative practices
developed by a company or companies. In experimental case studies, the researches test a
practice or procedure that they have developed in the case company. Exploratory case studies
are preliminary investigations where the researcher attempts to explore reasons for particular
accounting practices in order to generate ideas and hypotheses for later empirical testing.
Finally, explanatory case studies try to explain the reasons for accounting practices by
focusing on a specific case using theory to explain the specific instead of producing
generalization. (Scapens, 1990)
When considering the research design, the first key decision for the researcher is to what
extent prior theory should influence the research question and data collection (Vaivio, 2008).
This consideration matters as at one extreme, the text could be biased towards the theory
while at the other extreme it could be biased towards the field evidence (Ahrens and Dent,
1998). In any case, every researcher is inevitably informed by their past experiences and
previous research but in order to make the research meaningful for others, the researcher
should provide as comprehensive account of the theory that shapes the case study (Scapens,
1990). In addition, selecting clear theoretical orientation and conceptualization is needed to
filter the research evidence and provide guidance to empirical observation (Vaivio, 2008).
Moreover, Ahrens and Dent (1998) argue that field
However, while comprehensive theoretical framework is required, an overtly strong
adherence to prior research and constructs may lead to suffocating empirical insights
(Vaivio, 2008). Therefore, the researcher should not ignore emerging informal evidence as
that could indicate new issues that should be examined and as the case move forward,
additional theory may also need to be introduced and the researcher should be flexible for
such developments (Scapens, 1990). However, Vaivio (2008) reminds that comprehensive
theory on its own is not enough as ultimately the empirical findings need to reconnect to the
theoretical starting point or otherwise its conclusions risk to be rather myopic.
Second key issue is the depth versus breadth (Vaivio, 2008). Does the studied phenomenon
call for a single case study to explore to examine the detailed context revealing how the
organizational processes, tension and competing interests are influencing the management
accounting, or does it call for multiple case study to provide a less detailed analysis but
offering comparability revealing similarities and differences in the studied phenomenon
(Vaivio, 2008). Small sample case studies in management accounting have potential to
produce rich accounts which can be especially useful for analyzing conflicts that arise in
organizational setting as well as their underlying tensions (Ahrens and Dent, 1998). As such,
they can provide a deeper understanding into the studied phenomenon than large sample
field research (Vaivio, 2008; Ahrens and Dent, 1998).
However, this brings about the question of generalizability. Qualitative researchers are prone
to making statistical over-generalizations over their findings (Vaivio, 2008). Statistical
generalization is only possible through large samples of a given population and as such,
single case study is inevitably too small as a sample and therefore making statistical
generalizations is difficult (Scapens, 1990). On the other hand, case studies are useful in
developing theoretical hypothesis that can be statistically tested later or can be used as a
study method through which theories are used to explain the observations. Conducting such
research can reveal theories that provide convincing observations and should retained or
reveal theories that do not and should be modified or even rejected. Therefore, case studies
require looking at theoretical generalization  rather than statistical
generalization . (Scapens, 1990; Vaivio, 2008).
As this thesis aims to study MAC as process and focus on discovering resistance to MAC as
well stability of MAS, the most appropriate method for the study is the single case study that
has both descriptive and explanatory elements. Through this method, the study has the
potential to produce a rich and deep account of tensions and conflicts that arise from MAC
and application of the MAS. In addition, the study applies the Kasurinen, (2002) change
model and attempts to use it to produce convincing observations and as such, aims at testing
the theory with regard to its applicability in the case setting.
Issues of validity and reliability cannot be avoided in single case studies (McKinnon, 1998).
According to her, validity refers to the question whether the researcher is in fact studying
the phenomenon they are claiming to be studying. The validity of the research is decreased
if the research is designed or conducted in a way that the researcher ends up studying more
or less than the phenomenon they originally set out to study. On the other hand, reliability is
related to whether the empirical data collected in the case can be relied on by the researcher.
The reliability of the research could be affected negatively if the researcher fails to check for
consistency of the respondents  answers in order to avoid accidental circumstances  arising
McKinnon (1988) has identified four threats to reliability and validity in qualitative research.
The first threat is observer caused effects which refer to the reactive effects that the presence
of researcher on the site could have. It is possible that the participants of the study alter their
behavior resulting in the researcher not observing the natural setting. On the other hand,
observer bias is related to the selective perception and interpretation of the researcher. As
every individual including researchers have their unique pre-existing biases shaped by their
background, political views, culture, etc., the observer bias cannot be separated from the
individual and is present at all stages of the research. In addition, data access limitations need
to be considered as well. First, the researcher spends a limited time at the site and cannot
observe what happened before nor what happens after while the period itself could present
abnormally saturated with the studied phenomenon. Secondly, the research hosts might limit
access to data, people, events or restrict mobility leading to the researcher studying less than
the complete phenomenon. Finally, the complexities and limitations of human mind pose a
threat to reliability and validity as the statements that the subjects make might not be taken
at face value. Firstly, the subject may consciously attempt to deceive the researcher in order
to appear in better light. Secondly, the subject may attempt to present the events honestly
but may however forget things, have missed events or report through their own biases shaped
by their perceptions and opinions. (McKinnon, 1988)
Issues of reliability and validity are reduced in relation to the amount of time the researcher
spends in the organization (Vaivio, 2008). Mackinnon (1988) argues that firstly, it reduces
observer bias as the researcher can concentrate on getting to know the organization and less
pressure is on developing hypothesis and conclusions which if made too early with too little
it can effectively overcome observer caused
effects as the longer the researcher spends at the site, the less likely the subjects are able to
behave different from usual. Finally, time spent in the field increases possibilities to access
more data and events and therefore reduces data access limitations (McKinnon, 1988).
However, researcher conducting a qualitative research must maintain appropriate distance
from (Vaivio, 2008). Hence, become
emotionally and psychologically too involved in the organization (McKinnon, 1998)
Issues of reliability and validity can also be tackled through multiple methods and
observations (McKinnon, 1998). While extensive interviews are the primary source of data,
they should not be solely relied on (Vaivio, 2008). Using multiple methods and observations
can compensate for limited time on the site as well as help tackle all of the four threats to
reliability and validity through repeated observations of the phenomenon to rule out
accidental circumstances and verify existence of the phenomenon (McKinnon, 1988).
Especially, using multiple sources of data such as memos, reports, manuals and even
participant observation in addition to interviews is especially allows triangulation of data
that enhances the validity of the observations (Vaivio, 2008). Triangulation of data is
achieved through assessing the validity of evidence by comparing it to evidence gathered
from other sources (Scapens, 1990).
Finally, McKinnon (1988) states that social behavior while in the field is important for
reliability and validity of the research as becoming accepted as non-threatening and taken
for granted part of the setting can unlock many doors to data reducing access limitation. In
order to do so, the independent nature of the study needs to be communicated to the
interviewees to avoid being perceived as  (Vaivio, 2008). Additionally,
by being genuinely interactive and giving the researcher can gain the confidence, trust and
respect of the interviewees (McKinnon, 1988). However, the researcher must avoid
expressing their opinions or otherwise the research may become politized (Vaivio, 2008).
Moreover, taking sides can also lead to alienating the one side or another and lead to being
perceived untrustworthy and unneutral McKinnon (1988). Finally, the case organization or
this confidentiality is respected to maintain good relations with the subjects of the study
(Scapens 1990). In addition to data limitation, appropriate and good behavior is effective for
tackling observer caused effects and complexities of human mind effects (McKinnon, 1988)
The case company was selected as it has gone through a major structural and management
accounting change from 2016 to 2019. Additionally, the researcher has worked in the
company for multiple years and was granted good access to interviewees as well as any
internal documents and reports.
The case study has been conducted through semi-structured interviews of six interviewees
that hold or have held central positions in the company during the period studied. As the
study is focusing on changes in MAS and reports produced by it that are used primarily by
the management of the company, the interviewees consist of personnel who hold central
positions in the company. Therefore, the interviewees consist of former CEO, current CEO,
current CFO, Head of global operations, and two business line/unit managers.
The interviewees received the topic and description of the thesis via e-mail prior to the
interview to allow recollection of events that have happened during the time of the changes.
However, the research questions and description of exact focus of the study were not sent
beforehand in order avoid pre-determined answers and allow genuine reaction to the
questions. The interviews were conducted either face-to-face or through teams and were
recorded. In addition to interviews, the researcher has used multiple sources of data such as
reports produced by the MAS, annual reports, press releases, board materials and other
internal documents in order to achieve triangulation of evidence and increase validity and
reliability of the thesis (Vaivio, 2008; Scapens 1990).
The researcher has been working in the company for over four years and has been involved
in designing the MAS as well as been responsible for producing reports in that time frame.
Due to the considerable time and position in the company, the researcher has good access to
data as well as interviewees reducing data access limitations. In addition, the researcher has
been working with the interviewees on almost daily basis which in turn reduces the
likelihood that they would act differently to normal reducing the observer-caused effects.
Finally, the likelihood that the interviewees could deceive the researcher and the effect of
forgetting important events
organization, the interviewees and the phenomenon.
However, while the researchers role is somewhat similar to participant observant
(McKinnon, 1988) and the research gains many of the benefits to reliability and validity that
the role can provide, there are many important differences caused by being directly
employed by the company. Firstly, as the researcher has held a position in the company, he
has inevitably formed certain biases and opinions of events prior to the research. Secondly,
there is the danger that being knowledgeable of the events and phenomenon prior to the
study could lead the researcher to unconsciously follow a pre-determined path and not be
sensitive to contradictory evidence or even discard such evidence as it arises. Finally, the
researcher is inevitably psychologically and emotionally involved with the organization and
the appropriate distance from the phenomenon and organization is difficult to achieve.
Therefore, while the time spent in the organization and involvement in the events increases
the validity and reliability of evidence, it also does the opposite as the observer bias is greatly
increased.
In order to increase the reliability and validity, the researcher has kept these threats in mind
throughout conducting study and an open mind to any emerging evidence that could be
contradictory to prior beliefs and understanding. Moreover, the interviews have been
conducted professionally through avoiding to express opinions and asking probing questions
into interesting evidence arising in the interviews. In addition, prior to the field research, a
theoretical framework has been compiled and field research focus and structure has been
designed through this framework in order to provide a theoretical angle to the phenomenon,
provide guidance and distance the researcher from the organization. Finally, two of the
interviewees had left the company by the time the research was conducted and as such, could
possibly be more open in their answers and in expressing their opinion and therefore,
increasing the validity and reliability of evidence.
4 Empirical part
The case company is a mid-size publicly traded Finnish multinational company founded in
1975. The company is a developer and manufacturer of electronical products to industrial
and telecommunication network sectors. However, the company has traditionally had a very
strong focus on concentrating mainly serving only the few largest companies in the
telecommunication network sector. In fact, the company was originally founded to design
and manufacture custom built rectifiers, inventers and power supplies for two
leading telecommunication network clients. Since then the company has diversified its
product portfolio and customer base. At the time of the study, the group had operations in
Finland, Italy, China, USA, Sweden, Estonia and Tunisia. The company will be referred to
as the group from this point forward
As many companies in the world, the group experienced a considerable drop in demand in
2008 and 2009 due to the financial crisis. The decline in demand was followed by strong
growth during 2010 and 2011. However, due to the financial crisis, the group became
increasingly aware of the risks in its reliance of telecommunication sector dominated by two
major customers that constituted almost 80% of its net sales in 2011 and 2012. These risks
began to materialize in 2012 that was characterized by strong fluctuations in demand of
telecommunication products. In line with recent strategic changes, in 2013 the group
completed the acquisition of SPA, an Italian electronical power supply and rectifier company
that had a strong focus on industrial sector, a wide product portfolio consisting of standard
as well as custom products and a larger customer base.
As a result of the acquisition,  net sales in 2014 was split 54% in
telecommunication sector and 46% in industrial sector. However, even with the sizeable
acquisition the  net sales in 2014 finally only reached the same level it had been in
2011. In addition, the group remained highly unprofitable between the years 2012 and 2014.
In 2015, the group appointed a new CEO. Prior to his appointment, the group had operated
in a business unit structure consisting of three units. One of the units was the recently
acquired SPA and the other two units were an ambiguous split of the group as it was prior
to the acquisition of SPA into industrial and telecommunication sectors. The split was
ambiguous in the sense that they shared many of the same functions such as sourcing and
procurement, manufacturing, administration and partly research and development.
Furthermore, the telecommunications sector had historically been the dominant unit and
focus of attention.
In 2015, the group initiated a new strategy which included restructuring of the organization
into global functions. The goals of reorganization were to increase integration of SPA into
rest of the company, focus resources of the whole company to better serve customers and
reduce duplication of work. By that point, SPA was still using its original name and brands
and run as a separate entity altogether with little integration yet.
The global functions were created as global combination of cost centers at each country. The
previous general manager of SPA was appointed as global head of sales and marketing, head
of operations was gradually moved from his role and left the company, the head of research
and development of telecommunication and systems was appointed as the global head of
research and development and finally, the CFO of the group was given oversight of global
general and administration which included functions such as human resources, IT and
finance.
Even though the structure was already in place in 2015, there was no unified financial
reporting along this structure until April 2016. All the businesses and legal entities continued
with same reporting as they had done before. In April 2016, the finance function in SPA
started reporting the consolidated sales margin by product, customer and customer group for
the entire group. The calculation was complex due to internal sales between Tunisia and
Italy as well as China and Finland. As the report was to represent consolidated sales and
sales margin, the internal margins had to be eliminated at product level while product costs
had to be calculated using actual realized manufacturing costs each month.
Meanwhile, finance at headquarters in Finland took over the responsibility of providing
consolidated fixed expenses report following the cost center structure. The report was to
include following dimensions: local account, group account, global function, subfunction
and legal entity (namely geographic location). One of the major complications of both these
reports was that practically every company in the group had a different information system
which made consolidation of the data a manual, time consuming and error prone process. In
addition, the consolidation of the reports was made in excel on transaction or account level
resulting in a sizeable pivot file.
In line with the group level reporting and organizational structure, functional managers were
held accountable for the fixed expenses of their cost center through budgeting. In addition,
sales and marketing was held accountable for sales and operations for product cost through
sales and sales margin budgeting. Financial expenses were not included in the unified group
management reporting and the overall responsibility remained within global finance function
and group CFO.
While revenue grew reasonably in 2015, the company continued to be highly unprofitable.
Additionally, especially in the telecommunication sector, the company was facing
increasingly intensive competition and losing out to its competitors for new product projects.
product portfolio was becoming more mature and some products
started nearing end of life. Then early in 2016, Net Sales declined significantly and the
company recorded considerable losses. In the summer of 2016, the company appointed a
new CEO who will be referred to as the CEO from this point on.
After his appointment in 2016, the CEO focused initially on outsourcing the production in
China. This production facility was the producer for telecommunication and industrial
businesses from Finland. s as well as tied capital
considerably and outsourcing of the production facility was a large part of this process.
Outsourcing was finally completed in 2017, however, operations in China still continued on
a smaller scale as the company still had sourcing & procurement, technology &
development, sales & and marketing and administration staff working there. All of the
telecommunications production was outsourced to a Chinese supplier while systems
own production facilities in Tunisia. Prior to this
change, the Tunis facility had been serving the sales from Italy.
When I joined the company in spring 2016, the financial situation was very
challenging. This created external pressure to look for solutions and of course
we were looking for cost efficiency with the changes. From my experience, cost
efficiency can be achieved by getting numbers closer to people so that there is
not just one lump but instead you can see the effects of your efforts. (CEO)
In 2017, the CEO initiated the move from functional organization to a matrix organization
consisting of business lines and support functions. The change in structure was motivated by
needs to increase financial performance though getting numbers closer to people.
From the functional organization, we created four business lines in which the
managers would be accountable for sales margin, EBITDA and net working
capital. Therefore, there were three indicators. Sales margin because it was
an indicator that the company was accustomed to, EBITDA in order to have
accountability for fixed expenses and the third indicator net working capital
that was worked on for two years. First, we had to start with teaching people
what is net working capital and what it means in practice. In addition, we were
focusing on customer satisfaction and supply reliability. However, from
finance point of view these were the three indicators that we wanted to focus
on. (CEO)
According to the new structure, four business lines were created. These were Telecom and
Systems which were managed from Finland and Sweden, and Digital light and Digital Power
which were managed from Italy. Each of the business lines were to include the following
functions: Sales & Marketing, Quality & Environment and Technology & Development. In
addition to the business lines, global Sourcing & Procurement, Operations and General &
Administration functions remained as in the functional structure. Managers would be held
accountable for three key indicators, sales margin, EBITDA and net working capital (NWC).
In the new structure, the previous Sweden based key account manager for one major
telecommunication client and head of key accounts was elected as the head of Telecom
business line. The previous Italy based Sales & Marketing manager was appointed as the
head of Digital Light and Digital Power business lines. The previous Italy based Sourcing &
Procurement manager remained in control of his function and was additionally appointed as
the head of operation. Meanwhile, Finland based previous Research & Development
manager was appointed as the Systems business line manager. Finally, the CFO of the group
assumed control of the other support functions such as finance & control as well as IT.
Therefore, there were no outside hires and holders of central roles in the previous
organization structure were given a central role in the new organization while some were
promoted from within the company ranks.
The current production manager was gradually moved from his role, sales and
marketing manager gained a larger influence to things he wanted to control,
sourcing and procurement manger retained his position. In principle, we tried
to offer as much if not more responsibility to the managers. (CEO)
However, although the business lines were to have certain functions, the split was rather
ambiguous as business lines in SPA, Digital Light and Digital Power, shared all the S&M
and R&D resources while Telecom R&D supported heavily Systems R&D in product
development. While the structure consisted of global functions and an ambiguous split of
business lines and the group wanted to report business lines at EBIDA and EBIT level, this
meant that the reporting had to be built partly based on directly attributable cost and profit
centers as well as allocating costs of global functions to the business lines. The reason for
implementing such ambiguous structure instead of independent business units and creating
profit and loss visibility through allocations can be seen from following quotes by the CEO
and operations manager.
The company had made a significant change in logistics and the thinking was
that global logistics resources will be cost effective and therefore it is sensible
to maintain unified logistics. Meanwhile, the idea was also to eventually
lighten the central (operations) management by transferring duties to business
lines by already appointing some employees (within the function) to support
certain business lines. At the time, the business line heads did not have the
required ability and experience from running a business and therefore it
he idea
was to progress step one, step two, step three. At the time, we also believed
that having a unified operations organization will lead to better result when
production facilities were intended to produce products for all the business
lines. (CEO)
The progress made in the global sourcing and procurement was also highlighted by the head
of operations while he also emphasized the need to be closer to the customer and markets
from business point of view explaining the decision to implement a matrix structure.
In sourcing, we put a lot of effort since the acquisition in 2013 to create a
common approach to the key strategic partners or suppliers. So regardless of
whether the component was for telecom or power or light, we tried to approach
as one strategy. Which were the key partners we wanted to focus on for needs
of our business lines. So we took decisions accordingly in order to cover the
commodities and best serve the business lines. One of the goals was also
to have an organization that could respond better to the market requirements.
Moving from the pure functional organization the matrix was a way to
combine, maybe on one side trying to maximize the benefits of global approach
to partners and suppliers and so trying to leverage the scale of the company
instead of fragmenting. At the same time allowing different sales organizations
to be more focused and adapted for the market requirements. (operations
manager)
There was an understanding that the group had made progress in creating global operations
during the functional structure. The corporate management recognized the benefits of having
a global operations function as that would give the company economies of scale with regard
to purchasing, negotiating power towards suppliers and avoidance of duplication of roles.
Therefore, the company was still looking to gain cost and operational efficiencies through
having global operations and administration while recognizing the different nature of the
businesses and allowing them to focus on specific customers and markets from sales and
development point of view. In addition, it was viewed that some of the business line
managers were still too inexperienced to assume control of full business units and instead, it
would be better to progress in steps and create a matrix organization where all the costs are
allocated to business lines.
The reason for allocating the costs of global functions was that during the functional
structure, the group had lost visibility towards profitability of each business and felt it was
necessary to regain this visibility as highlighted by the following comments of the CFO and
systems business line manager:
The goal was also to drive the understanding that the cost structure needed for
achieving the sales margin, these should be in balance. The reason for
allocating the costs was to see how profitable the business lines actually are
because this view had been lost in the functional organization. (CFO)
You could not clearly see where the money was coming from. Money was
coming but there were many opinions and views of what is profitable and what
is not. I think the business line thinking was good and it was important for the
CEÒ to bring clarity. I remember his reaction in the beginning when he came,
drivers are making? He got 15 different answers and he was very frustrated.
Many times, I was with him on a flight and he asked did we find out anything
anything what you are saying to me. He reacted in a right manner and made
the organization more measurable. (systems business line manager)
As mentioned earlier in the description of how the functional cost center reporting and sales
margin reporting was built, the same problems regarding the information systems and
internal transactions still remained when the matrix organization was designed. As the
reporting of the functional structure had become the core of management accounting, the
new business line reporting was built on top of it. The sales and sales margin for each
business line were directly attributable through the product profitability report compiled by
SPA accountants. The fixed expense report was used to directly assign cost centers to
business lines and as the cost basis for allocating the indirect cost centers.
The allocations themselves were designed through discussions with business line and
functional managers to determine the most appropriate cost drivers. The resulting allocation
drivers were finally very detailed and calculated on monthly basis. For example, the sourcing
and procurement functions were allocated to business lines through multiple drivers on sub
cost center level such as PO lines, material value of sales, quantity invoiced and cycle time.
Meanwhile R&D cost was allocated through hour sheets and S&M based on pre-determined
percentages of time usage per business line for Digital Light and Digital Power. Finally, the
global general administration was allocated based on headcount and share of revenue.
The functional organization had only been in effect for two years before it was changed to
matrix organization. During this time the group had lost visibility to the profitability of
businesses and the management of the company saw that the best way forward would be to
implement a matrix organization where costs are allocated to business lines to regain this
visibility and line of accountability. In addition, it was viewed that the functional
organization was not working optimally and had not been internalized.
The [functional] organization structure was built by my predecessor in fall
of 2015. However, Italy was working partly as its own entity and what really
bothered me was that everyone was talking about sales margin and being
profitable was understood to come from sales margin.  This (sales margin)
has to be also contrasted to what are the fixed expenses per business line.
The company had a tradition of working based on geography and in reality the
functional organization never worked in a optimal way. The weakest element
was that accountability was too easily transferred to others. If something went
wrong somewhere, it was always someone else fault. (CEO)
The CFO at the time further expanded:
Assigning accountability for profitability was a major factor. Secondly, as SPA
had never been integrated into the ETI group, the horizontal organization
where you for example have R&D that has completely different processes,
tools and so forth in both countries, if you are not going to integrate them, you
realistic to get the functional organization to work. (CFO)
For example, Italy has had P/L reporting that they have had a strong focus on
regardless of the actual organization structure and most likely in Finland as
well. The organization structure was in a way a hybrid as it was in a way
functional but for SPA the operative focus was on the what they like to call
SPA Group (Italy, USA, Tunisia). This was one of the reasons why we shifted
to the business line organization. [ ]. This was my interpretation [the
reporting as well] and this is why we started to push the organization. We
responsibility to the managers for that the cost structure is appropriate and
p (CFO)
The functional organization had not been fully implemented and the previous legal unit
based organizational structure still very much existed. In addition, the acquired SPA had
never been fully integrated into the company. The management accounting and reporting
had been built to follow functional structure but this did not follow the actual, informal
structure of the group. The different parts of the group still had an operative focus based on
the structure prior to the functional structure. While the corporate management accepted that
sensible to
implement it as the businesses had very different processes and a business line organization
where managers are held accountable for EBITDA instead of just costs and sales margin
would be the best way to go forward. The management also felt that there was a lack of
accountability within the functional organization and the management wanted to change this
through changing the organizational structure and management accounting. They wanted to
extend financial accountability beyond cost center and sales margin responsibility to include
EBITDA in order to highlight the need to have sales margin and fixed expenses in balance.
My understanding is that, for example, there was a global sales organization,
instance go over the global sales figures at the management meeting? That I
a way it (the structure) was a type of matrix even
then. Italy was concentrating very strongly on the SPA group result and the
manager was in his mind, first and foremost, the CEO of SPA and only then
sales and marketing manager. The organization structure and management
accounting did not match. This is my interpretation. (CFO)
The goal was to transfer accountability to management in a way that the
numbers are closer to them because the problem in my view was that we have
fused two, maybe three businesses which each had their own cultures and way
of looking at things. With the functional organization, it was extremely easy to
transfer accountability to other people. The idea that I can have an effect on a
number was not close enough to people. Therefore, we tried to build the
organization so that people would see the effects of their efforts more
concretely. (CEO)
This was further supported by the group controller while he further emphasized the
importance of accountability over profitability as the main driver for the change:
The main goal was that the business line reporting drives to that every month
you get given, this is how much EBIT you have made, this is how much profit
you have brought to the group. This is your responsibility to get this number
t
(Group controller)
While changing the organizational structure was an integral part of the overall change, it was
made numbers first. The group wanted to leverage the economies of scale provided by global
operations and administration while accepting that the functional organization would not be
feasible. However, at the same time the group wanted to create the business line organization
to gain visibility that was perceived important therefore resorting to allocations. The
numbers first view is further supported by the following quote from the CFO who was asked
whether the organization change was the dominant change.
I would say it is other way around. The organization change was made in order
to change the accounting into this model. The organization and accounting
change were at least 50/50 if not the accounting being more important. It was
also the strategy to see what these businesses are (through numbers) to see
what we are going to do about them. At the same time, all businesses were
making their own business plans which was a part of the evaluation. This
required the organizational change but it also required the accounting change
so that we can understand what the businesses are. [ ]. This was also a pre-
carve out for us to see how separate the businesses are, it helped us understand
where the businesses had overlaps and where they were separate. Therefore,
it created certain boundaries for how we can think of the future business
portfolio and what we can do with them. (CFO)
The goals of the changes were based on powerful economic arguments of cost savings and
efficiency while promoting accountability. However, this view was not shared by all.
is for a larger company and that here (with business line structure) we are
reason, I believe that already at that point there was a goal to look for what
we can separate and later sell away. With hindsight, this view has only been
strengthened along the way and finally telecommunication did find a new
owner, but I believe that there were other (businesses) considered along the
said. (telecom business line manager)
When addressing the split of the SPA group into two business lines, the operations manager
voiced similar suspicions:
I have always seen this as a division more on paper than reality. Because if
you go deep into the organization, the sales organization was not divided in
that way, it was more on the channel [actual division of duties] than digital
light and power. [ ]. It was mainly an accounting aspect of better
understanding the profitability of segments. I would say like this, if I find
opportunities in the market maybe for merging other companies, or even
e a better
understanding from the accounting point of view of profitability of power,
really challenging. (operations manager)
Some of the managers did not buy into the official goals of the change. They suspected that
there were ulterior motives to the change in the form of selling parts of the company away.
Therefore, there was a lack of trust towards what the actual goals of the changes are. Some
of the business lines saw the accounting changes as an attempt to create accounting entities,
a sort of carve-out structure that can be divested. To certain extent, the possibility to divest
some businesses had also been officially stated as a possibility by the corporate management:
It was openly told in management team that every business is in the shape that
we can either buy more into it or it can be divested if necessary. This could
have created to some the perception that the only goal is to sell. It is possible
that this created resistance. However, in my view this is positive factor but
perhaps for employees who have been here 10, 15, 20 years, it creates
uncertainty but for me it only creates positive angle as the goal here is to get
the businesses to compete with each other for who will get potential investment
funds. There needs to be competition because a company that is in a state of
stability for too long, is usually going to lose. (CEO)
The corporate management had in fact communicated that divesting is one of the options.
However, from the corporate management point of view, the goal was rather to create
competition between the business lines for investment funds while maintaining the threat of
selling the business in case it is not performing.  Instead of creating positive competition,
this led to some managers believing that the only goal was to sell, therefore creating an
uncertainty for especially long serving management and providing grounds to resist the
change.
When the business line organization was built, the management had consciously attempted
to give at least as much responsibility to each business line head as they had in the previous
structure. However, the manager of Digital Light and Digital Power business lines had in
effect been primarily the CEO of SPA and only secondarily the global S&M manager. With
the new structure and the push to make operations a truly global function, it became clear he
would lose control of the SPA organization including the production, sourcing and
procurement as well finance and IT.
Even though the previous organization was functional, it was as I mentioned a
pseudo functional organization. The actual organization even then was
business unit based. This was especially the case SPA group which was an
organization of its own. This was run by the head of S&M who saw his primary
role as CEO of SPA and all other roles are secondary regardless of the
he had to give up ownership of the manufacturing and this was a big issue (in
the process). This led to the argument that if I cannot control these, why are
these in my P/L?. [....]. At the time, the biggest fight and source of conflict
resulted from sourcing & procurement, finance & control and IT not being
included in the business lines as some business lines definitely wanted to
control these as well. However, we were looking for synergies and volume
benefits, for example, in negotiating purchase contracts and other aspects as
well by looking at them for all of the business lines simultaneously. (CFO)
While the resistance was directed at being held accountable for costs that you cannot control,
there was clear resistance from the business line manager and informal CEO of SPA for
losing control of his organization. Meanwhile, it seems that this was part of the goals in
keeping the global functions separate from the business lines. The manager had held the
position of CEO of SPA prior to the acquisition of SPA and held to this position through the
functional structure. It was only now at the introduction of the matrix organization that
resulted in the loss of control of manufacturing, operation and support functions. However,
while the management accounting became the target of the resistance stemming from loss
of power as well as perceived threat of selling some businesses away, it was also the cause
of resistance in itself as well as the matrix structure.
What we realized only afterwards, was that the idea of the matrix, that even
without being directly under your line organization and having direct control,
you should influence and control operations, did not work at all. It was black
and white, either or (for the line managers). After all, we specifically looked
for, and communicated out loud, that we were (through the allocations)
looking for conflict [between business lines and operations]. What we were
trying to achieve with this positive conflict, is that the business line head
challenges the sourcing and procurement for why are they doing something
that raises their product cost. This way we should ensure that the company
benefits instead of optimizing within global (operations) or business line view
the trade-off and if not, me and the CEO are excellent referees. This
influencing we did not achieve. Instead the reaction was: if this is not mine
(managers), I will down tools and will not interfere with it, this of course
culminated to persons and inexperience in how matrix operates. (CFO)
The management was looking for the conflict between business lines and operations through
allocating the costs. The goal was to get the business line managers to question the level of
service and its cost while avoiding sub-optimization. However, some of the managers
refused to accept costs that they cannot control into the PL. From the corporate management
point of view, this came down to the individual factors as well as inexperience in working
in a matrix organization. Meanwhile, the operations manager whose costs were allocated to
the businesses shared a similar view in acknowledging that some business lines definitely
wanted to control their own operations while resisting being held accountable for costs they
could not control.
Absolutely, 100% percent [to control their own operations]. I can tell you that
this has been for a long time an element. Not everywhere but with some
business lines this has been really a strong topic. The topic was from business
line leaders, how can respond of PL even if I don
strategy of procurement strategy of manufacturing, suppliers, so on. Which is
in a nutshell a key of my cost in PL. This, with some business line was really a
big topic but as I said, not with all business lines. But this for sure was an
element of discussion and attrition sometimes. Honestly, my personal view of
this is that it goes very much to the maturity of the company or an organization
to work in matrixial role instead of a pure functional role. (operations
manager)
While the corporate and operations management felt that the resistance to being held
accountable for costs that are not under direct control of the line management was due to
power as well as the company lacking maturity and experience to work in a matrix
organization, the businesses had concerns over the accuracy of the allocations and the service
level they received for the money.
Product profitability reporting was very useful and helped us a lot. This gave
us visibility to what the product costs actually are on top of BOM. This was
maybe the best thing that came from cooperation. The allocations however,
allocating the work, it caused that the cost could not be traced, 20% of this,
30% of that but what we actually got was a different question. It did not in the
sense make it difficult but the costs were maybe sent to somewhere where they
. [ ]. If you for example should be getting a quarter of time from
someone work in Italy, where do I see that I get that time when I feel that I
the resource is sitting next others who he works for. (telecom business line
manager)
In our view no [getting service]. This created tensions on this side in the same
way as there was invoices coming in from that direction. There was all kinds
of overheads and mark-ups and others. It became an internal transfer-price
competition which is a very bad thing as well. Nobody was able to do anything
is still happening. In my view, it is a serious system level failure when you see
culture such as this. It was easy to question that this is not what we are getting.
[ ]. The lines themselves were justified as they did do something for us but
 (systems business line manager)
While the business line manager saw the product profitability report (consolidated sales
margin by product and customer) being very useful as the business line had never had such
visibility, he did question the usefulness of the allocations. The resentment came from costs
being ambiguous and hard to trace as well from the feeling that he was being assigned costs
that did not belong to him. In effect, there was a feeling that he was paying for something
that he did not receive while not having the possibility to influence these costs and the service
level. Meanwhile, the systems line manager also highlighted the feeling that they were not
getting the service they paid for and the allocations were artificial. Moreover, he suggested
that
The operations manager also acknowledged that there were discussions over the service level
compared to the cost, however, he did not fully share the view that the level of allocation
would have been distorted and some business would have been paying for service they did
not receive.
Yes, I remember this kind of discussions which were, I would say now in two
areas, one area was the allocation of global functional costs to the business
lines, which was referable not just to sourcing and procurement but all global
functions. So it went to all global functions that were allocated to the different
business lines and sometimes the comments received, again not from all but
. [ ]. In the
amount that was charged to the business lines or if the business line was
receiving an equivalent perceived counterpart because I talk about perception,
was hardly, I remember an objective discussion saying I pay for this, I receive
this. The same was to my memory for other functions, so if you had the global
finance or CEO or others, how to reallocate that cost to different business
lines. (operations manager)
In fact, the operations manager felt that the allocations had been thoroughly and objectively
designed:
I remember in the end there was a very long work together I spent with you
and others in Finance team. To my memory, I think what was achieved at the
end was quite articulated but was fair, made sense and quite objective on the
reality of the people. Even in selection of the drivers etc. It was the best we
could achieve what we had. (operations manager)
The operations manager highlighted the use of the word perceived and stressed that it was
hardly an objective conversation suggesting that they had also other reasons for questioning
the costs. Moreover, while the business line managers mainly stressed the feeling of not
getting service from operations, the operations manager highlighted that similar questions
were asked about the administration allocations. The group controller of the company
provided further support for this view.
The business line head has the right to ask from the service provider whether
the real-life benefits have truly manifested from working together and does it
match the cost that is in the income statement. This does create discussion and
should create discussion. [ ]. However, on the other hand, the line manager
should start from looking at the result after direct expenses and understand
how the result after those expenses has developed before going into discussion
about the corporate overhead allocations and other. From experience, for
many business line managers the discussion goes first to the allocations in
order to shift focus from the business performance. This is the classic situation
especially if revenue is falling. If revenue is in the right direction, then the
business line manager does not question the allocations as much but
unfortunately for us the direction is opposite and the discussion has gone on
the wrong path. (group controller)
While acknowledging that the business line managers have a right to question and should
question the service level provided by the global functions, he shared the view that the
discussion was not only motivated by the level of allocations and service but was also
stemming from the poor performance of their business. Therefore, suggesting that it was at
least partly motivated by shifting attention away from the performance of the factors under
their direct control. In fact, most of the businesses along with the group were performing
below expectations in terms of financial indicators.
The allocations were designed to create discussion over the expenses of global functions cost
and service level. These questions did arise but perceptions differed. However, from the
corporate management point of view this did not lead to the influencing that they were
targeting. Instead, it was suggested by one of the business line managers that this created an
unhealthy view was also supported by the
operational manager who saw that this created internal friction that drained the energy of the
employees and resulted in losing focus on the outside world.
Overall the group, from the numbers we could see that we did not obtain the
expected results. When you are in this kind of situation, you try to understand
the root causes, try to define corrective actions. I remember that time the
several discussions: it s because of my performance, because operations is not
delivering. And vice versa, operations was claiming that business was not
providing reliable forecast or the demand was not strong not enough and we
were losing customers or it was below expectations in terms of volumes and
back and forth. I think overall, that we were probably or sometimes this is the
risk of company to lose a lot of energy in internal discussions and lose a little
bit of focus to outside world, customers, suppliers and markets. And you are
entrapped to inside the company and this is not healthy for the company when
you end up in this mood of looking into the other field. (operations manager)
While the business line managers did not directly criticize allocations themselves, one of the
business line managers later highlighted that it was only after the allocations were largely
removed that he really understood and could analyze where the costs were coming from. The
detailed nature of the allocations and transparency of the management accounting was also
questioned by the CFO.
The new reporting for the business line structure was largely designed before
I joined. In my view, it was made too detailed. Based on previous experiences
with allocations, they need to be very clear in order for people to understand
them and to understand what drivers are used for allocating. Partly due to the
fact there was resistance to the business line view and idea, and partly due to
e allocation was finally
made in a way that makes the outcome ambiguous. If the business line
managers were asked where does this (number) come from, nobody could
answer. The reason why the business line reporting was accepted (by
managers) in the first place was that everyone had to get all the details
included in the report. Nobody or at least some was ready to accept it as
roughly right but instead it had to be made on level that bares no meaning
anymore. Especially with regard to (allocation of) global functions. (CFO)
Since the acquisition of SPA, despite the functional structure, the companies had not yet
been integrated to each other. In effect, the group had two headquarters, one in Finland and
another Italy, as well as businesses that had all along been separate and had different tools,
customers and business logic. While moving to the business line structure from the short-
lived functional structure, the decision to continue with two global functions, in addition to
the aforementioned reasons, can be also viewed as an attempt to continue integration.
However, despite the matrix structure, the group management wanted to gain visibility to
the profitability of the four business lines of which two were based in Italy and two in
Finland. The company had lost this visibility and lacked understanding what was profitable
and what was not. While the split of digital light and digital power was rather ambiguous
and mainly a calculative practice, it can be seen as an attempt to understand how the business
in Italy works and what is driving the results. However, as Italy had been operating as a
separate entity with its own structures, management, reporting and little prior central
interference in these, this increased visibility and splitting of Italy was met with resistance.
One definite factor was also that the current management in Italy was very
protectionist. Everything that was viewed as group intervention and
influencing was poison to the management. The worry was that the reporting
is a way of infiltrating the SPA and also that everything would not be in their
control. (CFO)
The CFO further commented on the splitting of digital light and power into two business
lines:
There was resistance to it. The Italians saw this as an invasion to their
autonomy and their organization had been built in such a way that for example,
R&D resources were used for both lines. (CFO)
This view of reporting increasing visibility is further supported by the views of the Italy
based operations manager.
That could have made sense to even have profitability by customer. I remember
attempts to achieve that but apart from very short time it was not used much,
it was also challenged very much, or per product. We always stopped at higher
level of profitability and hardly went to the bottom line for customers. [Was
there resistance?]. I think so, yes. Honestly, I think so, you might have
difficulties to correctly allocate the costs. With the given systems, the ERP
system we are using and the tools we are using. Of course, there are limitations
to have a perfect work done or apparently perfect work done. But overall there
was some resistance to it. [ ]. The fear was that looking at some customers
for PL profitability point of view could have meant a company decision to get
out of given customer and then the challenge was how do I get back to this
level of business with other customers. That was resistant, or products, it can
be the same for products. We never had a bottom line for products, we always
stop at max a gross margin. (operations manager)
While he was not directly assessing the split to digital light and digital power, the operations
manager was referring to attempts to calculate profitability on an even deeper level such as
customer and product. However, he did highlight that the resistance to this increased
visibility originates from fear of group interference to SPA internal operations and as such,
violation of its autonomy. However, there were also real concerns about splitting SPA into
two business lines from sales and marketing as well as research and development point of
view because the business lines were using them as a common pool of resources and splitting
them could lead to duplication of these resources.
The group had a very fragmented information system structure. While Finland, China and
Estonia were using the same outdated ERP system, the other major companies such as Tunis
and Italy had separate ERP and accounting systems. In addition, the other smaller companies
such as Sweden, USA and others did not have ERP systems and had external accounting
companies compiling their bookkeeping. While the company had consolidation software to
compile consolidated financial statements, it was based on the legal entity structure and only
held account level information. Due to the nature of the system structure and the way the
business lines were formed, the business line reporting was compiled in excel by
consolidating accounting data compiled from all the systems in the group as well as external
accounting firms.
The biggest barrier was information systems. The information systems were
too decentralized and it is easy to say with hindsight that at the time we should
have started changing information systems. It could have been possible but we
were wary of undertaking such a project simultaneously although with
hindsight it might have been a mistake. (CEO)
One of the practical issues in implementing the change was the flexibility of
the systems. One factor that slowed down the implementation was that the
basic product profitability calculation and management accounting support
was in a dire state. In order to make changes such as this, you need to have a
very solid and systematic management accounting that you then translate to
new. Now that we built on top of a time consuming and laborious reporting, it
did not support decision making in the way required. Especially with product
profitability, the report comes so late that the actions are inevitably reactive.
(CFO)
The business line profitability reporting was built on top of pre-existing reports that are very
manual and the whole process took at least 10 working days to complete each month. While
using pre-existing reporting as the basis made the change easier to accomplish, it became a
major barrier for reaching the goals of the change effort. The management took a conscious
decision at the time to not invest in new information systems at the time but with hindsight,
concluded that this should have maybe been done. The inflexibility of the systems was to
become a major source of frustration to the management as it was time and energy
consuming and meant that any corrective actions would be very reactive due to time lag.
It took way too much time to collect the data and therefore analyzing the
information was too far. We collected the data but the phase that should be
done very quickly after month close, the analysis, was too weak. People ran
out of juice by the time monthly reporting was finally closed.  Also, if with
the changes we could have used more time for analyzing, I believe there would
have been much less resistance. If instead of taking 10 days to complete
reporting, we could have cut it by two to three days and use this time for
analysis, there would have been much more support from everyone as it would
have increased the feeling that it serves. Now, we could bring the service
aspect forward enough. (CEO)
In a small organization where one person is doing the reports, you should
serve many people as in our case. The challenge is that many of the managers
running the business on general level. You provide the information but the next
step which is the most value added, the opening of the drivers in order to make
better decisions and from accounting view, when you cannot provide
automatized reports and not cannot give automatized reports to the mangers
discussion then should be more free-form discussion. This type of
discussions are what create shareholder value and clarity through numbers. If
. (group controller)
Due to the significant effort taken by the reporting, there was little time to analyze the results.
As the business line management were coming from sales or development backgrounds, they
had little prior experience in understanding costs and their drivers. Therefore, the corporate
management viewed that the management would have needed more support and analysis
from the accounting staff. However, by the time the technical aspect of reporting was
completed, the staff had run out of juice and were preoccupied with other finance matters.
As such, the analysis and support side was too little too late. This resulted in the reporting
not providing the benefits it could have done and bring forward the service aspect. In
addition, this also had another consequence as well.
As the reporting could not keep up with the decision making support need, this
lead to that, the prior reporting practices, informal side reports, which were
often very manual, continued to exist and were used as they had always been
done.
managers, changing it was difficult if not impossible. (CFO)
When everyone still had their old systems as well, they did not stop using them.
no trust in the new figures. The further you get from the headquarters, the more
certainly old reporting was used because of being used to do them for 10-15
years on top of which the management still required these reports. The only
way to change this is to blow up the basic systems to remove the possibility to
continue this way. (CEO)
The new business line reporting was intended to replace old group reporting as well as any
other profitability reporting used in the businesses. However, after the initial lack of trust in
the numbers, due to the inadequacy of information systems, the business line management
kept informal reporting structures running and therefore, the new reporting did not replace
the pre-existing, now informal reporting. In effect, this created double work for the finance
department which in turn further reduced the time for more value added analytical and
business support work. This in turn was hindering the attempt to increase financial
accounting based on the new reporting and structure. In fact, the lack of unified information
systems were viewed to be such a major barrier for the changes that it was highlighted by
the CEO on multiple occasions and finally noting that when undergoing similar projects, the
lesson to take from this case is that you need to invest in a unified information system to
make it work. However, while the problems related to inadequate systems were a significant
cause for old reporting persisting, it was suggested that it was also due to adherence to old
ways of working.
Another is the attitude and thinking. The readiness to change ways of thinking
and doing. This is where me and the CEO probably of whom both are
accustomed to if not change then at least look at the year organization on
yearly basis, did not realize how difficult it is for people to cognitively change
the way things are done. (CFO)
Also, when people have become accustomed to doing things in a certain way,
it is much easier for people to continue doing things as they have always done
even though it would be time consuming as it creates a certain security. This
was a weakness. (CEO)
While the adherence to old ways of working were one of the barriers for increased financial
accountability and for the new management accounting and reporting, it was also a wider
issue in implementing the new structure and for getting people to change the way they are
working. In addition, the company had always been a very research and development
company that is focused on producing mainly customized products to select customers.
If you look at Finland, the culture has not been numbers oriented. When I came
the numbers, this what the profit accountability is, understanding the numbers.
oriented which means de facto that you are primarily interested in the
numbers. The first thing to be discussed with the managers is not product
launches or development projects and what people are doing. Instead, has the
result come, has the sales come, these are the things to go through first. Then
you go over how you are going to do the next numbers and this is when you
discuss the projects, lay-offs or whatever. In a results oriented organization, it
is quite br
This organization was not results oriented when I came in 2018
has been a very product development, engineer oriented house. If I would
concisely pin point the major problem of the company, it would be that this has
been primarily a customer serving engineering department instead of a profit
unit that makes economically sensible decisions. (group controller)
Due to the nature of business, the group as a whole had a strong engineer and customer needs
oriented culture. However, this was especially the case with Finland and the Telecom and
Systems business lines located there. The focus of the group had always been in designing
and producing high quality, customized products to better serve the final customer. There
was a strong belief that focusing on these areas would then automatically lead to profitability
which had been the case in history but had not been the case in previous years. While one of
the main goals of the change was to increase financial accountability and become more
results oriented, the group controller saw the engineering and customer oriented culture,
especially in Finland, being a competing force for results orientation when he arrived in
summer of 2018. Meanwhile, as earlier highlighted by the CFO, the group was not
accustomed to working in a matrix organization. This was especially the case in Italy as it
had historically had a very hierarchical organizational structure where decisions are
centralized. This was further highlighted by the operations manager.
I honestly have matured a personal view that no matter the organization but
what counts is the people that are living in the organization. How much you
are used or inclined to manage in collaboration knowing that something is,
you are dependent on the others as well. There should be common work
together and you cannot control everything or how much you are used to an
environment where you want everything under control you want to take
lture
and the teams are used to and managers are used to work together. (operations
manager)
Therefore, while the engineering and customer orientation was prevalent for the whole as a
whole, it was especially the case for the business lines in Finland. On the other hand, the
change effort also ran into cultural issues with regard to the hierarchical culture in the former
SPA group. In addition, it was further highlighted by the telecom business line manager that
national culture had also a role to play and suggested that in this environment, it would have
taken more time to get the changes to work.
If you put together organizations from different cultures, we have China,
Finland, Italy, and assume that they cooperate when being told that we have
this organization. Then you are not grasping the human nature. In these people
have to learn to know each other, trust each other and have unified goals. The
basic thing for the line managers is to get everything together and this takes
time. Yes, we can do something at this [top] level but to get it to work you need
to have proper processes. (telecom business line manager)
The second major accounting change was net working capital (NWC). In addition to having
strong focus on sales margin, the company had historically not had a strong focus on balance
sheet items. However, as the company had been unprofitable for many years, there was the
need to increase focus on especially net working capital.
Another thing that bothered me as much as was that when we are talking about
sales margin while forgetting the tied in capital. From my experience, there
can be businesses that do not need much tied in capital and can therefore
operate with a smaller margin while there can businesses that tie in more
capital and for that, you need to have a much higher sales margin. (CEO)
What was concretely observed was that when the key account managers who
are also responsible for the inventories were asked how much do you have in
inventory, the answer was as much as is needed to satisfy demand. When they
were further asked who is responsible for the inventory, as concrete example,
we had a warehouse in Tallinn, and the answer was that the accountant is
responsible for the inventory. The key account managers did not understand
that they were in fact responsible for the inventory level and they saw that the
accountant sitting in Tallinn was instead responsible. The situation was in
other words a mess. (CEO)
Furthermore:
Historically Italy has focused very strongly on profitability which was one of
the reasons to start reporting NWC. It had not been followed at the level
necessary before and it had not been questioned before. The role of NWC
changed as for the CEO at the time, it was extremely important understand
how much capital is tied into business. (CFO)
The focus on networking capital was seen important by the CEO and especially with regard
to Italy. In Italy, the businesses had mainly been focusing on profitability and especially
sales margin had been given special attention. The corporate management wanted to change
this way of thinking and increase focus on net working capital. Especially the level of
inventories was seen to be too high compared to the revenue of the company. The corporate
management also felt that there was a lack of ownership especially towards inventories and
wanted to increase the businesses responsibility over the inventories. In addition, the
management wanted to increase the understanding that profitability is not only how much
profit you are making but has to be instead contrasted to how much capital is needed for
making that profit as highlighted by the following quote by the CFO.
This was implemented for the same reasons as the profitability. One thing is
how profitable you are in absolute terms after deducting expenses from sales.
But to one business you have to invest only 10 moneys and 1000 to the other.
If you can get 100 by investing 10, it is good business but if you can make 100
of the different businesses, we wanted to also include net working capital in
the business responsibility. (CFO)
While supporting the views of top management, the Systems business line manager
expanded that the way in which the company was operating was very old fashioned and
ineffective.
The second big thing was the inventories. It was in the culture of the firm,
especially in Italy, big inventories were not seen as a problem. NWC punishes
straight away from this and this was related to operative flexibility and
improving efficiency As an engineer the inventories were quite
unbelievable. The culture how material was purchased to inventories was very
old fashioned and not lean or JOT. Purchasing for lowest price was the driver
 (systems business line manager)
While the business line managers were held accountable for their NWC, this was in effect a
shared accountability with the operations. After all, global operations were in charge of
purchasing, inventory management and production while business lines were providing them
with the demand forecasts. Therefore, the business lines could directly influence only the
level of accounts receivables through payment terms of sales contracts and following up with
clients who have not paid their bills on time. However, as finance handles other aspects such
as factoring agreements with banks, the business lines did not have full control over the
accounts receivable either. As such, the business line managers were held responsible for
NWC that they had almost no direct control but instead had to influence the level through
collaboration with the operations and finance.
receivables. We had one big customer in Russia who owed us. This was what
distorted the whole NWC for us but accounts payable, Italy bought what they
mystery to me how they operate.
gorilla in the room situation, it is there but nobody seems to notice it. I had to
listen the lectures about decreasing inventories to frustration and me and HJ
noted that we cannot do anything about it. I never found out the reason and it
is still a mystery to me. My theory is that it is either an ability problem or then
it is not perceived important. It is not about not understanding it anymore, they
 (systems business line manager)
The systems business line manager especially highlighted that while they were held
accountable for NWC, they had the feeling that they could not affect the level of it.
Especially inventories and level of purchases were seen to be out of their control. Prior to
the outsourcing of the telecom production to a Chinese contract manufacturer, the rectifiers
used in systems products were produced by production site in China. However, when the
telecom production was outsourced, the production of these rectifiers was transferred to the
Tunis production site. When this change happened, the level of inventories was increased
significantly. The business line manager was constantly questioned about the level of his
inventories and pushed to reduce them. The business line manager tried to influence the level
of inventories through discussions with operations but in the end had to hold his hands up as
he felt that they could not do anything about the situation. He suggested that either the
operations was lacking in ability to reduce the inventories or simply did not care about the
level of inventories.
The businesses could primarily affect the level of inventories. The inventories
were under tight monitoring but on the other hand, the inventories were also
under the global sourcing and procurement function. I think the there was a
lack of ownership and additionally, the global sourcing and procurement never
had the global view but was only driving Italy. The net working capital
reporting was mainly a calculative practice. The busines
on it as strongly as we had expected. (CFO)
The corporate management acknowledged that the business lines had difficulty in
influencing the operations in reducing the level of inventories. While the inventories were
under tight monitoring, the corporate management felt that the global operations which was
mainly based in Italy, was mainly focusing on local business needs and co
view on the global level. Moreover, the corporate management felt that the global operations
did not do enough to reduce the inventory levels. In effect, there was a view that reporting
the NWC was merely a calculative practice having minimal operative effect. However, the
operations manager did not fully share this view.
 but this has
been a target year by year. We have grown through improvements, last year I
overachieved the target. Is this enough, I think no, we can do more. Maybe in
certain years that was not that ok but the issue is that it should be normal
continuous improvement. It cannot be one spot focus because we have a cash
crisis. Some goals were achieved and also this year we are achieving some
goals in inventory reduction. The process is starting to be more structured.
(operations manager)
While the operations manager acknowledged that during some of the years all the goals were
not fully met, he did feel that the operations had achieved targets related to inventories.
Furthermore, he highlighted that improvements in the process had been made with a more
sustainable long-term view instead of just one-time push to reduce levels in order to cover
immediate cash needs. Meanwhile, he also did not fully share the view of operations having
difficulties in sharing the responsibility with the businesses, at least not with all the
businesses.
I felt quite ok to work in collaboration with business line managers. Of course
as operations, I am aware and I was aware of having the opportunity to
implement several levers but I had no difficulty to share and work with other
business line managers. In some cases, the discussion was tougher, and maybe
the expectation was to have a different level of control from the counterpart.
And so, the argument was, hey you hold me responsible for net working capital
but I cannot control sourcing, procurement, plant so how can I respond about
that. Not everywhere but in some cases this happened. (operations manager)
The complaints from some businesses were related to being held accountable for something
they did not have in their direct control in similar manner to the profitability report. These
complaints were mainly originating from systems, digital light and digital power business
lines whose products were produced in Tunis. The collaboration with the Telecom business
line was seen less problematic.
Of course there was difficulties at the time (with operations). We did not
always have the same view on what the buffers should be and how forecast is
turned to orders. We have very short delivery time and from sales point of view
it would have been good to build buffers based on forecast. This caused some
problems but not too much. However, the flexibility was not there. (telecom
business line manager)
While highlighting that there were some issues and differing opinions on buffers and
flexibility, the shared responsibility was not seen as a major cause of issues. In fact, the
biggest improvements in NWC were achieved on the Telecom business. However, it needs
to be also taken into consideration that large part of the improvements in NWC were
achieved through outsourcing of the production which meant that raw material inventories
and purchasing was the responsibility of the manufacturer and payment terms were
negotiated to over 120 days. In addition, telecom had used to have a significant consignment
stock for a major customer in Estonia. The business was able to agree with the customer that
this would no longer be held by the end of 2018 and the stock was gradually cleared by then.
Besides the major improvements in NWC of telecom business and some improvements
elsewhere, the stock levels particularly were still viewed to be too high by the end of 2018
and continued to be under intense scrutiny.
While the group as a whole significantly improved its result in 2017, it remained unprofitable
and net sales continued to decline. The result improvements came from considerable cost
savings related to the outsourcing of production in China and satisfactory performance of
Digital Power and Systems business lines. However, early in 2018, it became clear that
improvement in performance would not continue in 2018 and the company already started
to make plans for the future and began looking for solutions. In the end, while all the business
lines were unprofitable in 2018 and experienced decline in revenue with the exception of
Digital Light which continued at the level of previous year, the most dramatic changes in
revenue and profitability came from the Telecom business line which experienced almost an
40% drop in revenue. As a result, the group experienced 22% decline in revenue and
recorded a significant loss. At the end of the financial year, the group appointed the former
CFO as the new CEO, former group controller as the new CFO, while the former CEO
remained in the company to complete a special project. In addition, the head of Digital Power
and Digital Light business lines left the company and was replaced by an outside hire.
However, for the purposes of the study and in order to avoid confusion, the personnel will
be referred to as they have been previously despite the changes in their positions.
By the end of 2018, the company decided to change its organizational structure by uniting
the two business lines in Italy into one line called Digital light and Power now managed by
the recently hired new manager. The global operations function consisting of operations in
Italy, Tunis, Finland and China was largely dismantled and operations were assigned to
businesses directly, only leaving strategic sourcing oversight and some support in the global
operations. Also, the global administration function was divided to the businesses so that
they had direct control over their finance and control as well as IT and human resources.
Therefore, former SPA group had full control over the digital light and power business units
and included the legal entities of Tunis, USA and Italy. On the other side, Telecom assumed
direct control of its functions in Finland, Sweden, Estonia and China while only the group
functions of CEO, group Finance and IT oversight was left in the group function.
The corporate management had also concluded that Systems business line was too small and
interdependent of other business lines as well as support from global operations. However,
the company saw the Systems as business that the company wants to remain in and grow.
Based on this strategy, the company purchased a company called PN on 31.12.2018 and the
systems personnel were moved into their facilities during spring 2019, effectively merging
systems with the acquired company and therefore creating a third business unit. Therefore,
in the new structure the company had three business units and a smaller group function. The
global operations and administration functions were effectively dismantled and the three
business units had direct control over their Sales and Marketing, Sourcing and Procurement,
Research and development, Quality and Operations support, Finance and Control, Human
resources and IT.
Even though we had global functions, we accepted the fact once again that
Italy had completely its own supply chain and production and also Finland has
its own sourcing and supply chain and in addition sourcing frame agreements,
there were no synergies. On the other hand, the global sourcing and
procurement management continued operate in Italy local context and
for the whole group. When considering all the different things that needed to
be done, even though of course we could have changed the focus of the
sourcing and procurement, it would have taken so much time and effort that
we decided that there are more important issues to deal with and therefore we
decided to split it to business lines. (CFO)
This a typical model where we move to step two. This was a significant part of
the plan. We concluded that the logistics [global operations] function can be
divided, it had become too large, we did not gain enough benefits from it, it
and in my view, this was a logical step two that often happens in these cases.
We progressed fully according to the original plan as it was made in the
beginning. We also took a step back from dividing Italy into two business lines
and fused them together. We saw that it was not possible at the time and better
results will be gained by treating it as one business line. (CEO)
The group had been looking for synergies from having global operations. However, the view
was that these synergies had not been realized and the global operations had not been able
to assume a truly global role. In addition, the corporate management came to the conclusion
that the artificial split of the Digital Light and Digital Power business lines was not sensible
to make more permanent. The CEO concluded that finalizing the business unit structure was
fully according to the initial plans and a logical step in this development. Furthermore, while
the synergies from operations could have been found in long term, the corporate
management saw that in the current situation it would have taken too much time and
therefore had to be accepted that it would be better to split the operations.
In fact, in addition to the strategic decision to purchase PN and combine it with the systems
business line, the group was also preparing for rights offering to finance the acquisition and
to improve the financial position of the company. At the same time, the group had concluded
that it did not have the muscles to run Telecom business on its own and decided to look for
a joint venture partner or a buyer for the Telecom business line which was finally fully carved
out from the company and divested in autumn 2019. Therefore, the management had
multiple overlapping projects that required their attention and as such, saw it better to move
into the business unit structure. However, while the management had concluded that the
global operations had not made enough progress in terms of synergies and was not feasible
at the time, this view was not shared by the global operation function itself.
Maybe in some areas of the company the expectation was to get much stronger
results or it was not ideal. The global concept implies that always the dilemma
is how much synchronized how much localized. In the moment I think we had
a good equilibrium but when the challenge to be profitable starting to be more
and more even for the business lines, there were claims that we were too much
global and not enough local. (operations manager)
I think honestly, that having a global sourcing has a sense and its something
every company should try to have. Even looking at our competitors and other
companies in the electronics. The difficulty for every company or the challenge
is to balance local an
is that we should have tried more to balance and experiment different global
versus local. (operations manager)
Contrary to the corporate management view, the operations manager felt that they had
reached a good equilibrium in terms of local and global service. Moreover, he suggested that
the businesses were in fact complaining that there was too much focus on the global aspect
and not enough business specific service on the local level. However, he also highlighted
these claims from business could be originating from pressure to increase their own
performance. Furthermore, he stressed that having a global sourcing is important and
common practice in the industry and felt that the company should have tried to better balance
the global and local aspect. The operations manager then highlighted that this view was
shared by the global operations function in general.
was more into the direction
that hey, but if we split what we have built in the years, we will just throw away
the job done, we will probably achieve less in terms of the results for the
company and we will duplicate the structures. The comments I received from
different colleagues in the different regions were more in the direction of
saying that splitting the sourcing could harm or jeopardize the company ability
to position itself better in the industry, in the market. So they were saying: hey,
if I go to a manufacturer, shall I present as a telecom sourcing and then
another guy will arrive as a digital power and digital light sourcing, and we
go talk to the same persons? And yesterday they were used to see us as one
company. These were the concerns and I think these were legitimate concerns.
Again, we are not a huge company and we are going to split this small piece
of cake and really putting ourselves even more smaller in front of the industry.
I think this is legitimate but that happened and of course with the sale or
divestment of telecom almost arrived to this that we have a small sourcing
teams very focused on very selected businesses here. (operations manager)
The global operations function felt that they had made an effort over the years to build a
global function and were afraid that this work would now be simply thrown away. In
addition, the manager felt they had legitimate concerns over the consequences of dismantling
the global operations. The concerns were related to losing negotiating power, duplication of
effort as well losing credibility in front of suppliers as after all, the group is not that large.
However, as the Telecom business was finally divested in autumn 2019 and preparing for
the carve out began already early in 2019, the potential synergies of having a global
operations function were further reduced. It was even suggested by some managers that this
the pending situation of Telecom could have been of the reasons dismantle the global
functions.
May
this I have no official information but did we already want to carve functions
came to mind that this could have been a factor. (systems business line
manager)
This view was further supported by the group controller:
There was also the separation of telecom to its own entity and truly separate
business was also driving this decision. The telecom project had been ongoing
since 2017 but started to actualize after only in 2019. This separation process
then started to show in the reporting as well. (group controller)
In addition to dismantling the global functions, in the spring 2019 it was also decided to
move the systems production from Tunis to a subcontractor used by the acquired PN. This
move was gradually completed by the end of 2019 and the inventories were moved from
Tunis to a consignment stock for the subcontractor. As highlighted by the systems manager,
producing the rectifiers in Tunis had not been successful from the business view due to
quality issues, delivery performance and inventory levels. There was also the feeling from
Systems side that when they tried to question things and influence the operations, the
operations got agitated and refused to support.
If we made forecasts to Italy about volumes, how they translate this and how
quite understand it. Even when trying to account for cultural differences and
exclude them as things are done little different in every country. The end results
you see in customer satisfaction, quality and delivery performance tell a clear
message that this is not going too well. This is a weak spot.
accounting from door to door was also never made, so that when 10 products
are ordered and you make hundred of which most work. However, how much
do you lose material and make into inventory. This type of analysis I did not
see and nobody was interested in. As SA [Finland based employee] said well,
start talking about these things. They get agitated when you start to dig into
these things. (systems business line manager)
While the Telecom manager had not experienced similar issues with the operations, he did
highlight that there was a feeling that the operations personnel based in Italy did not
necessarily understand business logics of the Telecom business.
The most difficult was that the operations was not included in the business. For
example R&D was included in the line and it was easy to get decisions on
projects and so forth. However, the material side, getting resources from
operations to the projects was more difficult. Operations management was not
against Nordics and tried their best but the resources we got from Italy,
although they tried, never really understood our business. Many times when
we were negotiating, the understanding of the goals was so different that it
consumed our energy and momentum. (telecom business line manager)
However, in the end the corporate management concluded that there had not been enough
progress and cost savings made and despite the differing views of the operations, it had been
a mutual feeling that the operations should be divided to the businesses.
They had apparently made a significant cost saving before I joined in 2015
and they felt that they had already adapted the organization. However, after
2015 nothing had happened. It can be said that the operations organization
was designed by the book but our revenue was missing one zero. The way that
the operations was operating would have been a good fit for a company with
ten times the revenue. (CEO)
This should have given better condition to the business line heads to run their
business and ease the tensions between business and operations as well as
administration. There should be less collisions this way. This mainly created
resistance from within the operations function. They wanted to keep it as one
entity but everyone else agreed it would be better to divide. They could not give
the service that the business lines needed. (CEO)
While the organizational structure was changed, also the accounting and reporting was
changed as well. As the global functions were largely dismantled, the allocations were no
longer required. Therefore, the reporting was mainly based on cost center and profit center
structure. However, as some strategic sourcing support remained, this was decided to charge
from the businesses through pre-determined monthly service fee instead of allocation. In
addition, certain costs such as stock exchange costs, CEO, global finance and board costs
still remained, these were still allocated to the businesses based on budgeted revenue on
monthly basis as a corporate overhead allocation. From the business line view this could be
described as a tax.
In the old reporting, the allocations were not directly visible from the business line report
and as such, there was no direct visibility into what is the direct cost of the business line and
what is allocated for it. As earlier noted by the CEO, this had resulted in the business line
heads not knowing being able to tell where the numbers are coming from. In the new
reporting, this problem was circumvented by dividing the operating expenses into direct
opex and indirect opex which included the corporate overhead allocation and any service
fees. The goal of this change was to make reporting more transparent and bring visibility
into what the business line heads could have direct impact over, what was taxed on them
from group side and how much they paid for services provided by other businesses and
strategic sourcing oversight.
We were fixing the aforementioned issues [too detailed and ambiguous
reporting]. To increase transparency and make it more simple by taking some
of the aspects away that were causing resentment. (CFO)
While the managers did not explicitly highlight any difficulties in understanding the
allocations, the Telecom manager highlighted that it was only after the second change that
he really understood where the costs were coming from and who was responsible for them.
It was much clearer. At that point I understood what expenses I had in China.
How much was HR (Human resources), how much was transportation
(employees) and so forth. Only at this point I saw what the China organization
cost was. Before this, it was allocated to different responsibility areas and you
could never get to the details. [ ]. Now I could ask China directly, what does
this cost? How is this handled? Before that it was like, is this operations
managers responsibility? Where is the answer going to come from? There was
the possibility that the person you ask misunderstands and you get a different
answer. When you get to the details and see that wow, picking up from the
airport costs this much or our offices in Suzhou cost this much or Wuxi costs
this much. This way you can much easier see what the cost is made of. (telecom
business line manager)
Therefore, in the previous structure and reporting, managers had difficulties understanding
the where the costs were coming from, what the costs were related to and who in fact was
responsible for them. As such, one of the main goals of the second management accounting
change was also to simplify reporting and make it more transparent as the ambiguities of the
previous management accounting was standing in the way of the goals of increased profit
accountability and achieving cost savings.
The reversal of the matrix structure and the initial management accounting could be
interpreted as a failure of the change attempt. However, while all the goals of the change
were not achieved resulting in abandoning the matrix structure and implementation of the
business unit structure, the management highlighted that the change was successful in
bringing the desired visibility.
These changes helped to increase the visibility what the business is in different
lines and in concrete terms, it helped us to understand what is the situation in
Finland for Telecom and systems and also in Italy what the situation is for led
drivers and power supply businesses as well as what is their relation in terms
of profitability. It did not solve the problems but it did give us the visibility that
we wanted and this provided the basis on top which we actually started to build
the strategy how to move forward from this. This also resulted in decision to
divest the telecom business and realization that systems can be a good business
but is simply too small currently. Therefore, it was an integral part of creating
a plan to fix this company. (CFO)
We did progress to the right direction but one hinderance was that the business
line heads did not have much experience from running a business and what it
means to comprehensively run a business. If they had more experience from
that, this could have worked out better. We did get cost saving but did we get
enough savings is another question. (CEO
While the management felt that there was progress made, they felt that it was not enough.
However, the accounting change did give them the visibility that they needed in order to
make, plans for the future. It helped them understand what these businesses are and to
formulate a strategy based on that. In support of this view, the corporate management
decided to strengthen the Systems business by investing in PN and combining these two,
keep Italy as one business unit instead of dividing and possibly divesting or shutting down
part of it as well as divesting the Telecom business. Therefore, it can be seen that the
management accounting change was an integral part of going forward.
The benefits of the increased visibility from the reporting was further highlighted by the
systems business line manager:
It brought the visibility that someone has to do that work but organization wise
the cost structure to the right level. Even now, someone is responsible for
sourcing and subcontractor operations and now it is in right place the cost. It
was part of the illusion that systems business is very profitable as there were
no sourcing costs and no module level R&D cost. Instead there was only an
engineer team and sales. It looked very flexible, cheap, efficient and makes a
perform, or the break-even is larger and per sales person it should sell more.
Or does it even scale up, will the engineering get clocked up next. All of this
became visible. (systems business line manager)
While highlighting that the operations were not able to support the business in the way that
business saw necessary, the Systems manager highlighted that the allocation of costs
revealed the support the business needed and how much it costs. Therefore, it brought
visibility what the cost structure should be for the business. The systems business had been
viewed very profitable in prior structures as it had only the direct costs of sales and
engineering teams while missing the cost for operations, product development and
administration support that it needed and was receiving. By allocating these costs to the
business line, it did not look as profitable as it had used to resulting in the manager
questioning whether the business is viable with current level of sales margin percentage and
net sales as well as whether net sales could be scaled up without equal increases in personnel
cost. However, the corporate management still viewed systems as a viable and scalable
business through getting synergies working within PN structure and therefore decided to
invest in the business.
In the end, the management accounting change can be viewed successful and unsuccessful.
In addition to earlier pointing out that in order to for the changes to have been more
successful the pre- d replaced by a
comprehensive company-wide system, the CEO also stressed that it would have considerable
aided the change effort if the company could have provided the managers with incentives
based on the new indicators. However, this was not possible due to the decreasing
profitability and financial constraints.
Also when you implement new indicators, it significantly helps if you can use
carrot and stick simultaneously. Then you can use them to challenge but also
reward performance. When reporting is developed and changed, and there are
new figures, their acceptance and use is wider if you get even a small reward
for good development. This we could not do because our figures were going
the wrong directions. (CEO)
5 Case analysis and discussion
The management accounting change in in the case company was accompanied a change in
company structure and lines of accountability. Due to the nature of overall change and its
goals, the MAC and organizational change are inherently entangled to one another and need
to be studied simultaneously. This was further highlighted by the CEO who argued that the
MAC and structural changes were 50/50 in importance, if not the MAC being the dominant
change as the change was motivated by need for increased visibility. This argument is fully
in line with Hopwood (1990) suggestion that in relation to organizational change,
management accounting plays three major roles which are: making things visible that
ic domain
of action. From these, especially the visibility created by management accounting was a key
factor in the overall change effort.
The following section will analyze and discuss the findings of the case using Kasurinen
(2001) change model and other literature presented earlier.
Innes and Mitchell (1990) have identified three sets of factors based on their nature and
timing in driving MAC. These are motivators that are influencing the change in general
manner, facilitators that are the necessary underlying conditions, and catalysts that are
directly related and happen in close proximity to the change (Innes and Mitchell, 1990). In
addition, leaders are required to overcome the barriers maintain momentum of change (Cobb
et al., 1995). Finally, the barriers to change are further classified as frustrators, confusers and
delayers (Kasurinen, 2002).
Between 2012 and 2016, the company had been recording considerable losses year by year.
In line with Munir et al. (2013), the financial situation had already motivated the move to a
functional structure as well as resulted in multiple changes in company leadership. Majority
of the losses were coming from the telecom business that was losing out to competitors in
project quotations for the major Telecommunication clients resulting in an ageing product
portfolio  Kasurinen (2002) of which many products were phasing out. While the financial
situation itself was a general motivator for the MAC and structural change, it was to a large
part caused by increased competition  in the market as suggested by the literature (Innes
and Mitchell, 1990; Cobb et al, 1995; Kasurinen, 2002; Munir et al, 2013).
At the time when the CEO joined the company, there was a perceived lack of accountability
especially in terms of financial accountability for profit and loss. In the functional structure
it was perceived too easy to transfer accountability to someone else and there was a feeling
that the managers were not in fact not held responsible for their performance. The company
also had a culture of focusing extensively on sales margin to justify whether a business is
profitable or not regardless of the fixed expenses involved. Therefore, the corporate
management wanted to extend the managers accountability to EBITDA. In addition, the
company had not had a culture of regarding NWC as being important, instead the extensive
.
However, as the company had been unprofitable for multiple years, reduction in tied in
capital was seen to be crucial and the management felt it was necessary to include NWC into
business line accountability. As such, the perceived lack of accountability for profitability
and NWC were influential motivators of the change. Lack of financial accountability has
been influential motivator of MAC in multiple studies (see for example: Siti-Nabiha and
Scapens, 2005; Nor Aziah and Scapens, 2007; Busco et al., 2011)
Even though the functional structure had not been in place for long, the company had lost
visibility into the profitability of the businesses. However, the top management had come to
the conclusion that the functional structure was not in place and wanted to regain the
visibility into how the company actually operates. Therefore, in line with Vaivio (1999), the
lack of visibility and need to understand of how the company works was a key motivator for
the accounting change.
The change effort was initiated by the CEO after he joined the company in 2016. His
appointment was a major catalyst for the MAC while he also became the leader of change
supporting the dual role of leader and catalyst as suggested by prior studies (Valuckas, 2018;
Munir et al. 2013). As he came in, the CEO concluded that the company was lacking in terms
of accountability towards profitability as well as tied in capital. In response to the difficult
financial situation, initially the CEO focused on outsourcing the production in China as a
priority. However, the company was still in a tight financial position after the outsourcing
and liquidity as well as future profitability had become important due to the extensive losses
made in 2016. Therefore, creation of business lines with profitability accountability and
especially the introduction of NWC as an important indicator was catalyzed by the
increasingly tight financial position of the company. Similarly, increasingly tight financial
situation and losses have been found to catalyze projects by multiple studies (Innes and
Mitchell 1990; Vaivio, 1999; Munir et al. 2013).
Prior to the functional structure, the company had been operating in a business unit structure.
Moreover, the functional structure had only been in place a short time and had not been
internalized. Therefore, the change to a matrix structure largely followed the pre-existing
hierarchical structure in the company and as such, the change was facilitated by the actual
structure of the company. Secondly, during the functional structure, the company had
introduced unified reporting in the form of profitability report and expense reporting. This
reporting served as base to build the new business line reporting. Without the pre-existing
unified reporting, the company would have had to start from scratch which could have
hindered the change and as such, the pre-existing reporting was a facilitator of MAC. Finally,
the responsibilities in the new structure were designed deliberately in a way that the
managers that held a central position would be given a central position in the new structure.
This can be seen as a conscious attempt to alleviate resistance to the change and as such, a
facilitator that had been put in place by the leader of change as suggested by Munir et al.,
(2013).
The importance of leaders in management accounting change has been highlighted
extensively in literature (Cobb et al., 1995; Vaivio, 1999; Kasurinen, 2002; Liguori and
Steccolini, 2011; Jansen, 2011; Munir et al., 2013; Valuckas, 2018). In line with literature,
the leaders had a central role in the MAC. In this case, there were two clear leaders of the
change, the CEO and CFO. The role of the leaders for initiating and leading the change were
crucial and the change would not have taken place without them. In addition, the CEO had
a central role in putting in facilitators place (Munir et al, 2013) and served a dual role as
leader and catalyst of the change (Cobb et al 2013).
Jansen (2011) and Liguori and Steccolini (2011) suggest that transformational leadership is
more effective when undertaking radical, revolutionary MAC that deeply challenges the
existing ways of doing things the type
of leadership present in the case in practice. However, the leadership style included multiple
elements of transactional leadership. For instance, the goal of the MAC was to increase profit
accountability and the corporate management were managing profitability through
management by exception using budgets. In addition, the managers were mainly held
responsible for results at EBITDA and NWC level while they were allowed to choose the
methods how to achieve the results themselves indicating less active role in implementing
changes by the leaders. Moreover, the management felt that the change attempt would have
been aided by possibility to introduce incentives which is also a distinctive feature of
transactional leadership as argued by Jansen (2011).
However, in line with literature suggesting that communication is key to successful
revolutionary change (Yazdifar et al. 2008) and an important characteristic of
transformational leadership (Jansen, 2011; Liguori and Steccolini; 2011), the change leaders
were also actively communicating and teaching the significance and meaning of the MAC
as a whole while especially concentrating on the net-working capital. Therefore, the
management style presented also transformational leadership features as well. However,
despite the communication and teaching, the management felt that enough progress had not
been made in getting the managers to understand and accept the meaning of especially NWC
suggesting that transformational leadership alone is not enough. Instead, the management
highlighted that incentives based on performance, which are a feature of transactional
leadership, would have produced better results. Therefore, this study suggests that in some
cases, it is rather the combination of the two that could lead to a more satisfactory outcome.
In line with Vaivio (1999) and Liguori and Steccolini (2011), the approach by the
management was systematic and coordinated as the change was clearly planned defined and
pushed forward with continuous effort. The business line management were held
accountable and pushed to increase their performance based on the results provided by new
MAS. However, in 2018, the corporate management had multiple simultaneous projects that
needed their attention. This led to the management concluding that there were more
important priorities and therefore made no sense to continue to push the change attempt
further. While Kasurinen (2001) and Valuckas (2018) highlighted the removal of the change
leader, in this case it was rather the shifting priorities of the change leaders that resulted in
systematic and coordinated push breaking up. However, this further supports the general
consensus in the literature that leaders are crucial for successful MAC.
While serving as catalysts and setting up facilitators, the leaders of change were integral in
creating momentum for change as suggested by literature (Cobb et al, 1995; Munir et al.,
2013). In addition to the management accounting and structural changes taking place, the
company was also undertaking many simultaneous projects such as outsourcing production,
rights offering, divesting Telecom business and acquiring PN. However, while these
multiple overlapping projects can be seen as evidence of momentum for change, it was in
the end directed more towards these projects rather than the accounting change in question.
Therefore, the MAC and structural changes were in fact creating momentum for other
changes in the company which in turn ended up consuming the momentum from the
management accounting change.
The literature and accounting change model mainly highlight the importance of leader and
momentum for change. However, Granlund (2001) study shows that there can be a leader
and momentum of stability and in the case company, this could also be observed. The
business line manager in Italy resisted multiple aspects of the changes and effectively
shielded his organization from the accounting and structural changes from having desired
managerial and operational effects. Therefore, he could be viewed as leader of stability and
he could be seen maintaining the momentum for stability counteracting the momentum for
change.
The MAC was an attempt to increase financial accountability and extend it to include
profitability until EBITDA. However, instead of implementing a business unit structure, the
management opted for matrix organization and allocating the global function in order to gain
synergies while producing EBITDA level profit and loss for business lines. Through
allocations, the corporate management wanted to motivate the business line managers to
influence the costs and services provided by the support functions.
However, as suggested Scapens and Roberts (1993) and Merchant and van der Stede (2017),
this change was resisted by the managers as they felt that they were being held accountable
for something that they cannot influence. The top management saw the resentment
originating from lack of experience working in a matrix organization as well as some
managers and employees being accustomed to working in a strictly hierarchical
organizational structure and culture where everything needs to be under direct control to the
extent that it had become taken for granted  way of working (Burns and Scapens, 2000).
Furthermore, similarly to Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) who found conflicting operational
and financial targets to hinder the change, the company was lacking results-oriented culture
and emphasized R&D as well as customer service orientation that was seen to be conflicting
with the aims of financial accountability. Therefore, from corporate
view, the lack of experience working in a matrix organization and the organizational cultures
can be viewed as influential frustrators. This finding is in line with literature findings
highlighting lack of capability or experience (Burns and Scapens, 2000) as well as
organizational culture (Kasurinen, 2002; Busco et al. 2011; Wahiyudi, 2009) and taken for
granted assumptions of how things should be done and how things are (Burns and Scapens,
2000) as important factors hindering MAC attempts when the change is not congruent with
existing culture and taken for granted assumptions.
Management accounting change is often perceived differently by different employee groups
While corporate management consciously tried to limit resistance from losing power by
giving them all a central role, it became clear that for the Digital Light and Digital Power
manager who had maintained the role of CEO of SPA since the acquisition regardless of the
official structure, was to lose this direct control. While the resistance was directed towards
being held accountable for costs and NWC that the manager cannot control, the resistance
was at least partly stemming from losing power to the global functions as shown by literature
(see for example, Scapens and Burns, 1993; Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007). The power
struggle between the business lines and global functions and the effective use of power  by
the manager to resist the change (Granlund, 2001; Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007) was a
significant frustrator for the structural changes and increased financial accountability along
the chosen key indicators.
Since the acquisition, the SPA group had not been implemented into the group. The
management of the SPA was very protective of the subgroup and any group interference was
seen as a threat to their autonomy. The new MAS was to create a visibility  (Hopwood,
1990) into the SPA organization by dividing the Digital Power and Digital Power business
lines in terms of profitability and NWC. This visibility was viewed as a threat as it could
reveal some operations to be unprofitable as suggested by literature (van der Steen, 2009;
Munir et al., 2013; Cobb et al., 1995). Moreover, there was a fear that through gaining
visibility, the corporate management could make decisions based on the results of the new
MAS past the local management of the SPA and therefore violate their autonomy. In line
with literature (Scapens and Roberts, 1993; Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007), the fear of losing
autonomy and the resulting protectionism was a significant frustrator of the MAC.
The company had very fragmented information systems and the business line reporting was
very manual and time-consuming process. The monthly reporting was usually finished only
half-way through the month by which time the finance department had run out of juice and
as such, any actions taken on the results were inevitably reactionary and analysis as well as
support from finance was insufficient. As the management lacked experience in using
financial information and the financial capabilities were centralized to top management and
accounting department (Liguori and Steccolini; 2011), they would have needed more support
from finance department in understanding and using the information for decision making.
Due to the time lack created by insufficient systems and centralized technical abilities, as
suggested by Scapens and Burns (1993), the new MAS did not meet the local requirements
of the business line managers. Therefore, in line with Yazdifar et al., 2008, they continued
to use and request the pre-existing informal local reporting that they had become accustomed
in order to fill the gaps. In addition to creating double work for the finance department, by
relying on and upkeeping pre-existing reporting, the business line management was in effect
barring  (Burns, 2000) the MAC from reaching the lower levels of the organization. As
such, the MAS did not have the managerial and operational impacts that had been desired
and in effect became decoupled from actual working activities (Yazdifar et al., 2008; Lukka,
2007; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens; 2005). Therefore, the inadequate information systems and
doing things as they always have been done were major frustrators of the MAC.
The management wanted to create visibility into what the business lines actually are and
how they contribute to the profitability of the group. They highlighted that the purpose was
to make a strategy of going forward which could include investing into certain businesses or
possibly divesting businesses that are not viewed as part of the future of the group. However,
many of the business line managers suspected that the primary purpose of the MAC was to
create calculative entities that could be eventually carved out and divested. Therefore, in line
with literature (Johansson and Baldvinsdottir, 2003; Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007; Busco
et al, 2006; see also Burns and Scapens, 1993), there was a lack of trust in the intentions of
the corporate management and the officially communicated goals of the change and the
MAS. The differing view of the purposes of MAC created confusion among employees and
can be interpreted as a major confuser of the change.
In 2018, the management had multiple overlapping projects that required their attention and
as such, had reached the conclusion that the global operations had not been produced the
desired benefits. Therefore, the focus on the MAC reduced and momentum was halted. By
the end of the year, the management had come to the conclusion that pushing the matrix
organization and the global functions forward was not feasible at the time due to other
priorities. Therefore, as suggested by Vaivio (1999), the management decided to revert back
to a business unit structure while maintaining some strategic operations support and a
reduced group function. In line with literature findings, introduction of multiple initiatives
(Munir et al., 2013) and shifting priorities (Cobb et al. 1995) create confusion among
employees and as such, can be viewed as confusers of MAC.
As the organizational structure was a matrix, the costs of global functions were allocated to
the business lines in order to produce business line profitability. The allocations were very
detailed and updated on monthly basis in a way where direct costs and indirect costs were
mixed together. This created a situation where costs were constantly shifting and tracking
them was difficult. As a result, when questioned about their costs, the business line
management could not give answers as the costs and their origins were ambiguous and
unclear. One of the main goals of the MAC had been to make the managers accountable for
their profitability and make decisions such as cost savings to improve their profitability.
However, the ambiguous nature of the reporting led to a situation where the managers did
not have a clear view of what the costs actually were, where they came from and who was
responsible for them. Therefore, this ambiguity of the cost allocations was a confuser for the
business line managers.
The top management concluded that the change had been successful in creating visibility
and highlighted that this understanding served as the basis for creating a plan to go forward.
However, simultaneously, the management felt that while progress had been made in
increasing accountability for profitability and tied in capital, these goals had largely not been
met. As such, MAC can be seen successful and unsuccessful at the same time (Liguori and
Steccolini, 2011; Malmi, 1997). Moreover, from corporate management point of view, the
progress in accountability was too little too slow. Reflecting on the changes, the CEO
suggested that the changes would have sunk in faster and more effectively if the company
could have provided incentives for the business line managers for reaching targets. However,
due to the falling profitability and financial position of the company, this was perceived not
possible. When analyzing the MAC in terms of its goals, not being able to provide incentives
can be viewed as a delayer as it slowed down and hindered achievement of the goals of the
MAC.
The MAC was motivated by external pressures such as competition in the market and
resulting falling in demand. Much of the research in MAC have highlighted external
pressures such as competition (Innes and Mitchell, 1990; Cobb et al., 1995; Burns, 2000;
Munir et al., 2013) and attempts to gain legitimacy (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens 2005; Dillard
et al., 2004) as the driving reasons to change MAS. However, while external pressures were
present in this case through competition and resulting fall in profitability
prominent as suggested by the much of the literature. It was rather the need to gain visibility
and understanding of how the company operates as suggested by Vaivio (1999) as well as
the perceived lack of accountability that served as the primary motivators of MAC.
In line with Vaivio and Burns (2001), management accounting change did not follow a linear
course. Even though the management suggested that the management accounting and
structural changes panned out as originally planned indicating that the move to the eventual
business unit structure was the plan in the first place, it seems likely that there was a real
attempt to make the matrix organization work and try to get the benefits of having a global
functions while assigning profit and loss accountability through allocations. However, these
changes encountered multiple barriers and were variably resisted leading to an outcome
other than intended. Therefore, as suggested by literature, the accounting change was
influenced by external pressures but was frustrated, filtered and shaped by internal dynamics
of the organization (Vaivio, 1999; Valukas, 2018; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; Liguori
and Steccolini, 2011; Granlund; 2001; see also Scapens and Roberts, 1993)
At first glance, the management accounting and structural change from functional
organization and reporting to business line organization and reporting seems to be a
hist  of the company (Burns and Scapens, 2000), it can be understood
that the functional organization was short lived and had only existed on paper and the actual
organization was instead a business unit organization and as such, the functional reporting
-Nabiha and Scapens; Nor-Aziah and Scapens; 2007)
from the actual structure of the company. Therefore, the actual revolutionary changes were
in fact the attempt to form a truly global operations and administration functions, splitting
Digital Power and Digital Light as well as extending accountability to include allocated costs
and NWC. As suggested by Burns and Scapens (2000), it was the revolutionary changes that
were the most resisted and difficult to achieve.
Burns and Scapens (2000) argued that evolutionary changes are likely to be easier to
implement as they do not require fundamental challenging of how things are done and should
be done. In support of this argument, the study shows that as the reporting itself was built on
top of existing group reporting, it can be viewed as evolutionary and as such, received little
resistance from accounting department. However, while the building on existing reporting
facilitated the change, the resulting reporting was not optimal as it took considerable time to
complete and allowed other informal pre-existing reporting to persist and as such, ended up
becoming a frustrator in itself. This observation is in line with Yazdifar et al. (2008) finding
that MAS that does not serve the needs of the organization, managers rely on other sources
2000 -
Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; Nor Aziah and Scapens). Therefore, while evolutionary change
might be easier to achieve, it can lead to a suboptimal outcome that does not have the desired
managerial effects.
Scapens and Roberts (1993) and Granlund (2001) highlight that while resistance to
accounting change may seem irrational, there often are real concerns over the change and
resistance could be therefore viewed rational from the employees point of view. In the case,
the management accounting change encountered resistance and barriers on multiple levels.
In line with literature, there was resistance to losing power, autonomy, being held
accountable for costs that are not in direct control. However, as suggested by Scapens and
Roberts (1993) as well as Granlund (2001), there were real underlying concerns over the
new MAS and structural change. Firstly, while the management saw the resistance to the
cost allocations rising from lack of experience working in matrix organization and
hierarchical organizational culture, the business line managers felt that they had tried to
influence the expenses and NWC but could not do anything about them.
Secondly, the corporate management wanted to divide the former SPA into two business
lines as they were viewed separate businesses. The corporate management suggested that the
resistance to the change was originating from corporate intervention being viewed as a threat
to their autonomy. However, these businesses shared most of their resources and separating
them could have led to duplication of effort and inefficiency. While this was avoided through
the use of allocations, there was a fear that this would become more permanent and could
result in a business being divested. Eventually the corporate management decided to
combine these business lines back into one business unit and as such reverted back to prior
practices as suggested by Burns and Vaivio (2001).
Finally, in the move to the business unit structure, the global operations was dismantled as
the corporate management felt that the benefits had not be realized and synergies were not
feasible at the time. However, the global operation resisted the dismantling of global
operations function as they felt progress had been made and this would lead to duplication
of effort as well as reduced negotiation power. Therefore, in all of the above sources of
resentment and resistance, the management had legitimate concerns over the changes made
and raising these concerns was rational from their point of view as suggested by literature
(Burns and Scapens, 1993; Granlund, 2001).
Burns and Scapens (2000) suggest that stability and change can co-exist. Lukka (2007) and
Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) brought forward that this co-existance occurs through loose
coupling of formal MAS and actual organizational practices. While such loose coupling can
be observed in the case study, the findings point more towards Nor-Aziah and Scapens
(2007) findings that this loose coupling was a result of stability caused by resistance rather
than Lukka (2007) suggestion that loose coupling could be a solution to allow simultaneous
stability and change. After all, the stability caused by resistance and barriers hindered
achieving many of the goals of the change. Moreover, in line with Granlund (2001), stability
and change could be viewed as opposing forces in the change attempt and as the inertial
forces accumulated and advancing forces waivered, the change effort was halted as shown
by moving into the business unit structure. In addition, the case revealed that there was clear
momentum for stability as well as a leader for stability.
Finally, while the MAC did not achieve all of its goals with regard to cost savings, synergies
and increased accountability, it should not be viewed unsuccessful. In fact, the new MAS
created visibility into the organization. The results of the MAS then were used as the basis
for making a strategy going forward. Therefore, in line with Liguori and Steccolini (2007)
and Malmi (1997), the change effort could be viewed successful and unsuccessful
simultaneously.
The Kasurinen (2001) change model provides structure for analyzing management
accounting change. It is useful in identifying the advancing forces based on their nature,
timing and influence. It also accounts for momentum for change and agency through
recognizing the importance of leaders in the change effort. In addition, it recognizes the
barriers of change and helps to categorize them into confusers, frustrators and delayers which
provides further insight into the nature of the hindering forces. Furthermore, as the change
effort marches forward, as suggested by Munir (2013), the initial barriers can become
advancing forces for future change. This was also supported by this study as the perceived
problems with allocations was initially a barrier but ended up being a motivator for
subsequent MAC. Therefore, the model is useful in analyzing MAC as a process that is
variably advanced or hindered by different factors and where these factors can change places
within the model over time.
However, while the model provides a comprehensive and holistic understanding of processes
of change, it only recognizes the role of stability through the barriers to change. In line with
Granlund (2001), this study provides evidence towards viewing stability and change as
opposing forces as well as indicates that in addition to momentum and leaders of change,
there can be a momentum and leader of stability. It is this stability that could be better
incorporated in the model. Therefore, the model is modified to include leader and momentum
of stability as opposing force to the advancing forces of change.
In addition, the Kasurinen (2001) change model directs the user to view management
accounting change as a top down effort where change is initiated and driven by top
management and lower levels of organization are on the receiving end. By incorporating
stability through momentum and leader of stability, the model takes the viewpoint of the
employees better into account as the strive for stability and resistance to change were
employees reaction to change. The revised Kasurinen (2002) model is illustrated below.
Figure 4. Revision of Kasurinen (2002) model
This thesis set out reveal how management accounting change has unfolded as a process in
the target company and answer the call for more in depth studies exploring resistance to
management accounting change and stability of management accounting systems. The thesis
has applied the Kasurinen (2002) change model as the main theoretical framework and
means to analyze MAC as a process. In addition, the aim of the thesis was to test the model
and possibly expand it to better take resistance and stability into account.
In line with objectives and literature, the thesis has revealed a rich account of management
accounting change as a process which has been variously affected and frustrated by internal
dynamics of the organization. However, while literature emphasized the importance of
external pressures in initiating management accounting change, in this case it was rather the
perceived lack of accountability and visibility which were the main motivators of the change
effort. Furthermore, the thesis has added to the understanding of barriers and resistance to
change through finding support to sources of resistance such as threat to autonomy, power
distribution, culture, inadequate systems, being held accountable for things not under
control, lack of ability and experience as well as adherence to old ways. In addition, the
thesis provided further evidence that the barriers and resistance to change contributed to the
stability of the system and this stability can be viewed as a counter force to forces of change.
While much of the resistance could be interpreted to be also the result of the organizational
changes, this study argues that this resistance was largely attributable to, and intensified by,
the increased and altered visibility created by the new system. In line with Hopwood (1990),
it was th making abstract things appear
real and creation of economic domain of action coupled with accountability for the results
that contributed to the resistance most significantly. This visibility allowed the management
to understand how different parts of the company were performing and what they were in
economic terms, in effect giving calculative shape to the organization and its structures for
which managers could be held accountable for. However, for some of the managers this
visibility was a threat and therefore, the visibility created by the system became the most
significant source of resistance.
The study also provided further evidence on the usefulness the Kasurinen (2002) model in
gaining comprehensive and holistic understanding of management accounting change while
further supporting the importance of change leaders. Moreover, the study contributes to the
accounting literature and to the model by connecting sources of resistance highlighted by the
literature to the barriers in the model, thereby expanding the understanding of the barriers
within the model. However, the main contribution of the study to MAC literature is the
suggested inclusion of leaders and momentum for stability into the Kasurinen (2002) model
as this better represents the countering forces of change and stability and takes more
comprehensively into account the viewpoint of the employees.
The findings of the thesis are based on a single case organization and as such, are not
statistically generalizable. Moreover, the findings are tied to the context of the organization
and therefore, contradictory findings could be found in different organizational setting. In
addition, the thesis has suggested a revised version of the Kasurinen (2002) change model
by incorporating leaders and momentum of stability into the model. However, as the
suggestion is based on findings from a single organization, the revised model would need to
be tested through further research in another setting.
The events in the thesis have taken place between 2016 and 2019. Therefore, the case study
is based on recollection of the interviewees of how these events have transpired at the time.
interviewees have forgotten important events or their
perceptions might have been altered by events taking place later as well as outcomes of the
studied phenomenon. Moreover, as the interviewees are employees of the company and it
needs to taken into account that they consciously or unconsciously misrepresent their
recollection of events in order to appear in more favorable light or refrain from presenting
views that could be harmful to them. In addition, as the single case study is a snapshot into
the organization, the researcher can only comment on prior events through using other
materials such as press releases, annual reports and internal documents. Furthermore, the
researcher cannot comment on how the change effort has continued to progress evolve after
2019.
Finally, as the researcher has been employed by company for multiple years and has
witnessed as well as participated in many of the events, the observations of the researcher
are inevitably affected by his own recollection of events as well as his personal biases and
opinions. In addition, being knowledgeable of the events and phenomenon prior to the study
could have led the researcher to unconsciously follow a pre-determined path and not be
sensitive to contradictory evidence or even discard such evidence as it arises.
This thesis has suggested that leaders and momentum of stability should be included in the
Kasurinen (2002) change model. The researcher argues that this would better take into
account the stability of MAS, change and stability and as countering forces, as well as the
employees view on the change. However, as stated earlier, this suggestion and these
arguments are based on a single case study that is tied to the context of the case organization.
Therefore, the researcher proposes that future research utilizing the revised model should be
conducted to verify its applicability and usefulness.
Kasurinen (2002) argued that the change model could be useful for practitioners in
identifying the advancing and hindering forces of change at early stages of the change effort.
This led to Kasurinen (2002) proposing that future illustration of use of the model in early
stages of the project needs more illustration. However, such studies have yet to be conducted.
This thesis found the Kasurinen (2002) model to be very useful in directing the research to
identify and classify advancing and hindering forces of change. Therefore, in line with
Kasurinen (2002), the researcher argues that application of the model in early stages of the
project could have helped the management to identify and circumvent potential barriers.
However, as this thesis was conducted after the change had taken place, it cannot provide
further support for these arguments. As such, the researcher repeats Kasurinen (2002) call
for future research to conduct studies to illustrate the use of the model in early stages of the
change effort.
Management accounting systems and have been shown to present considerable stability by
literature and this thesis. While management accounting systems provide a particular
visibility into the organization and create calculative boundaries for which employees can
be held accountable, any effort to change these systems are likely to run into resistance and
barriers. Therefore, the management planning an accounting change should carefully
consider the potential barriers and employee reactions prior to the change effort and put in
facilitating factors. In addition, the management should make sure that adequate leaders can
be assigned for the change and provide them with continued support in order to maintain
momentum and successfully implement the change. The process of identification and
classification could be helped by applying the Kasurinen (2002) model or one of its
revisions.
Furthermore, as this case revealed, the state of the information systems is an important factor
to consider when undertaking similar change efforts. To successfully execute a similar
 current systems and implement a new
comprehensive and unified system as suggested by the CEO. This could also work towards
forcing the employees to use the new system and abandon old practices that hinder the
acceptance of new ones. Finally, the management should critically evaluate whether the new
system actually is adequate or even appropriate for the company. As suggested by literature
and to some extent shown by this thesis, the new system implemented might not always be
positive progress and resistance to implementing it could be rational as well warranted.
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Background
1. What was your position in the company during the change?
2. Please describe what the accounting system was like before the change? What were
the managers held accountable for in financial view? What was the problem of this
system?
3. Had the previous structure been implemented fully? How was this working?
4. What were the organizational changes made?
5. What were the accounting changes made with regards to reporting, performance
measures? Were targets set? Were there incentives?
From functional to matrix organization
1. What were the reasons to change organizational structures and accounting?
a. External
b. Internal
2. What was the goal of the change?
3. Why was this specific structure and these specific measures chosen?
4. What was the design of management accounting system?
5. How did the change process unfold?
Resistance and barriers
1. Barriers to change?
2. What resistance occurred in relation to the structure and accounting systems change?
What was the reason for resistance?
3. How did resistance affect the outcome?
4. Were the goals of the change achieved? Was the resulting system optimal?
5. How was the implementation of the system? What problems started to manifest?
6. Were the old ways of working changed
From Matrix to business unit organization
1. How was the structure and accounting systems changed?
2. What were the reasons for the change?
3. Was this change successful?
4. Were there significant personnel changes?
5. Was there barriers or resistance to this change?
6. Was the outcome of the change intended and were goals achieved?
Background
6. What was your position in the company before the change? How did your position
change?
7. What was the problem of the previous structure and accounting system?
8. What in your view was the reason for changing structure and reporting system?
a. External
b. Internal
9. Did you agree with the need for change? And the goals?
10. Were the official goals in line with your perceptions
From functional to matrix organization
1. Were you being held accountable for your results using new system?
6. In your view, what were the problems with the new structure and accounting systems
7. What were the benefits compared to old system?
8. Did the new system help in managerial work? Were decisions made using
information?
9. Did you voice any concerns over the new systems?
10. Were the goals of the change achieved?
From Matrix to Business unit organization
7. What were the reasons for the second change?
8. Did the change alleviate the problems with the first system?
9. Was this system useful in managerial work? Were decisions made using the
information?
